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I. INTRODUCTION
Hundreds of Florida appellate decisions rendered in the past year could
be said to affect the conduct of business in Florida.' This survey does not
attempt to deal with them all. Only cases addressing matters of first impres-
sion, involving conflicts between the District Courts of Appeal or questions
stated by a District Court to be of great public importance and certified to the
Supreme Court of Florida, or cases clarifying or expanding existing prin-
ciples of law have been included.2
1. See Barbara Landau, 2006-2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners,
32 NOVA L. REV. 21, 22 (2007) [hereinafter Landau, 2006-2007 Survey]. This survey picks
up where last year's survey left off. Id. The topics included are similar to last year's survey,
there being noteworthy cases in most of the same areas, and several new topics have been
added. Id. at 22-23.
2. See id. A few cases did not fit squarely into any of these categories, but the facts or
application of the law was unusual. Id.
2
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11. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Arbitration
Mr. Johnson, the chief operating officer of Rocksolid Granite, Inc.
(Corporation), executed an agreement with All Top Granite, Inc. (All Top)
signing "only in his capacity as the chief operating officer of [the Corpora-
tion.]",3 The agreement contained an arbitration clause.4 A dispute devel-
oped and All Top began arbitration against both Mr. Johnson, in his individ-
ual capacity, and the Corporation.' Mr. Johnson first asked the arbitrator,
and then the trial court, to prohibit the arbitration against him since he signed
the agreement only in his official capacity and not individually.6 Although
All Top conceded that the agreement had been signed by Mr. Johnson only
in his official capacity, the trial court, relying on Alterra Healthcare Corp. v.
Estate of Linton,7 ruled that Mr. Johnson had to arbitrate the claims against
him.8 The ruling was appealed by Mr. Johnson, and the Fourth District Court
of Appeal reversed.9 The appellate court distinguished Alterra Healthcare
Corp., stating that the situation there was the reverse of the case under con-
sideration.'0 In Alterra Healthcare Corp., it was a party bound by the arbi-
tration provision who was seeking to avoid arbitration, the party there being
found to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract.1" On the other hand,
explained the Fourth District, in Johnson v. Pires,2 it was a nonparty who
sought to avoid arbitration.13 The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that
there are several theories under which a non-signatory may be bound by an
arbitration agreement, one of which is agency theory. 4 However, the court
found that the agency exception does not apply when a person signs only in
3. Johnson v. Pires, 968 So. 2d 700, 701 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 953 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
8. Johnson, 968 So. 2d at 701.
9. Id. at 701-02.
10. Id. at 701.
11. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 953 So. 2d at 579. It should be noted that Alterra Health-
care Corp. involved both situations, that is, a nonparty to the agreement seeking to compel a
nonparty to arbitrate. See id. at 578-79. The nonparty who sought arbitration was found to be
subject to the arbitration clause under the doctrine of "respondeat superior." Id.; see also
McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 357 (1st Cir. 1994).
12. 968 So. 2d at 700
13. Id. at 701.
14. Id.
2008]
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his or her corporate capacity, 5 citing Charter Air Center, Inc. v. Miller 6 and
McCarthy v. Azure. 7 The Fourth District concluded that arbitration could
not be forced on Mr. Johnson, although "[it is thus apparent that ... [he]
could have enforced the arbitration provision against [All Top] who agreed
to arbitrate."' 8
B. Enforcement of Settlement Agreement
In an earlier incarnation of Architectural Network, Inc. v. Gulf Bay Land
Holdings II, Ltd. (Architectural Network 1),9 discussed in the last survey,'
the Second District Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court for
an evidentiary hearing to determine if Architectural Network, Inc.'s attorney
"had [the] authority to settle" the litigation between Architectural Network,
15. Id. at 702.
16. 348 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
17. 22F.3d351 (lstCir. 1994).
18. Johnson, 968 So. 2d at 702. Unlike the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Johnson,
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in McCarthy, held that a nonparty to
the arbitration agreement, the appellant there could not compel a party to the agreement to
arbitrate. McCarthy, 22 F.3d at 363. Although, as the First Circuit noted, there are exceptions
to this rule. See id. at 356-57. The court stated that:
[plerhaps most important from a policy standpoint, adopting appellant's proposal
would introduce a troubling asymmetry into the law.... In appellant's scenario,
then, the agent, though he could not be compelled to arbitrate, nonetheless could
compel the claimant to submit to arbitration. In other words, an agent for a dis-
closed principal would enjoy the benefits of the principal's arbitral agreement, but
would shoulder none of the corresponding burdens. He would have found a way,
contrary to folklore, to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.
Id. at 361.
The First District Court of Appeal in Alterra Healthcare Corp. allowed a nonparty-the em-
ployee of Alterra Healthcare Corporation-to bring the arbitration action. Alterra Healthcare
Corp. v. Estate of Linton, 953 So. 2d 574, 579 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
The First District Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of respondeat superior applied to
make Alterra Healthcare Corporation's employees subject to the arbitration agreement. Id. at
578-79. However, the First District was not called upon to address what would have hap-
pened had the situation been reversed, that is, if it was the other party-here a third-party
beneficiary-that had sought arbitration against the employee of Alterra Healthcare Corpora-
tion. Id. at 579. If the employee had then objected to the arbitration, under the court's reason-
ing, it appears that the employee would have been compelled to arbitrate. See id. On the
other hand, the Fourth District did not explain in Johnson why it was "apparent" that Johnson,
the employee/officer, could enforce arbitration, while it could not be enforced against him.
Johnson, 968 So. 2d at 702. Johnson brings into clear focus the First Circuit's expression of
concern in McCarthy about "a rule that [would] allow a party to use the courts to vindicate his
rights while at the same time foreclosing his adversary from comparable access." McCarthy,
22 F.3d at 361.
19. 933 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
20. See Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra note 1, at 33-34.
[Vol. 33
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Inc. and Gulf Bay Land Holdings II, Ltd.2' The trial court held the required
evidentiary hearing and enforced the settlement agreement, with final judg-
ment entered for Gulf Bay Land Holdings H, Ltd.22 Architectural Network,
Inc. appealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal reversed.23 Gulf Bay
Land Holdings II, Ltd. failed to meet its burden of proof, which required it to
show that Architectural Network's attorney had the "'clear and unequivocal'
authority to settle" the case on behalf of Architectural Network, with the
Second District Court of Appeal reiterating that the "courts have been very
stringent in what they find to be... 'clear and unequivocal.'
24
HJI. BUSINESS ENTITIES AND AGREEMENTS
A. Franchises
Can an officer or a shareholder of a corporate franchisor be held perso-
nally accountable for violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act (FDUTPA), sections 501.201-501.213 of the Florida Statutes,
or the Florida Franchise Act, section 817.416 of the Florida Statutes?25 Yes,
according to the Fifth District Court of Appeal in KC Leisure, Inc. v. Ha-
ber.2 6 KC Leisure, Inc. (KC) alleged that it paid $50,000 to Relay Transpor-
tation, Inc. (Relay) for what Relay described as a "license" but that, accord-
ing to KC, was actually a franchise agreement allowing KC to sell and rent
electric vehicles.27 Eleven months after the payment was made, KC tried,
without success, to have the agreement rescinded, sending "written notice to
Relay" and its officer and stockholder, Mr. Haber.28 KC then sued Relay,
Mr. Haber, and others alleging that Mr. Haber was an active participant in a
scheme by Relay to provide misleading, incomplete, and incorrect informa-
tion to KC as the franchisee, thus violating FDUTPA and the Florida Fran-
chise Act.29 The trial court concluded that liability under FDUTPA is im-
posed only "on 'sellers and not their shareholders or individuals who act for
21. Architectural Network I, 933 So. 2d at 733-34.
22. Architectural Network, Inc. v. Gulf Bay Land Holdings II, Ltd. (Architectural Net-
work 11), 989 So. 2d 662, 662 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
23. Id. at 663.
24. Id. (quoting Weitzman v. Bergman, 555 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990)).
25. See KC Leisure, Inc. v. Haber, 972 So. 2d 1069, 1071 n.2, 1075 n.3 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2008); FLA STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 817.416 (2005).
26. See KC Leisure, Inc., 972 So. 2d at 1071.
27. Id. at 1071-72.
28. Id. at 1072.
29. Id. at 1072, 1075.
2008]
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[them].'" 30 The trial court also "found no specific allegations that Mr. Haber
personally participated in" alleged to be in violation of the Florida Franchise
Act.3 ' The complaint against Mr. Haber was then dismissed by the trial court
with prejudice.32 The trial court was wrong on both counts said the Fifth
District Court of Appeal.33 The allegations were sufficient to state a claim
under FDUTPA against Relay.34 Further, if there is corporate liability, there
may be individual liability, provided that it is proved that the "individual
defendant actively participated in or had some measure of control over the
corporation's deceptive practices. ' 35 Finding nothing in the case law under
the Federal Trade Commission Act that per se prevents suing an officer or
shareholder of a corporate franchisor for deceptive trade practices,36 the Fifth
District Court of Appeal concluded that KC's allegations, that Mr. Haber
directly participated in the conduct giving rise to FDUTPA violations, were
sufficient as against Mr. Haber.37 Likewise, the allegations set forth a cause
of action against Mr. Haber for fraudulent practices under the Florida Fran-
chise Act.
38
B. Corporations
Minority shareholders who disagree with the majority's decision on ma-
jor corporate transactions, such as the sale or transfer of all of the corpora-
tion's assets, have the right to have their shares valued-appraisal rights-
and bought back by the corporation.39 The issue in Williams v. Stanford°
was whether or not the statutory appraisal rights procedure was the exclusive
remedy available to the dissenting minority.41 The action causing offense to
the minority shareholders in Williams was the majority shareholders' alleged
engineering of the transfer of all of the assets held by the old corporation to a
30. Id. at 1072.
31. KC Leisure, Inc., 972 So. 2d at 1075.
32. Id. at 1072, 1075.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 1073.
35. Id.
36. KC Leisure, Inc., 972 So. 2d at 1073. The FDUTPA claim in count one was based on
deceptive and unfair trade practices "in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)." Id. at 1072.
37. Id. at 1074.
38. Id. at 1075.
39. Williams v. Stanford, 977 So. 2d 722, 726-27 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citing
FLA. STAT. § 607.1302(1) (2003)).
40. Id. at 722.
41. Id. at 724.
[Vol. 33
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new corporation that excluded the old corporation's shareholders.42 The old
corporation's assets were transferred to the new corporation in return for the
new corporation's assumption of the liabilities of the old corporation. 43 No
money changed hands."a Separate from the exercise of their appraisal rights,
the minority shareholders brought a shareholder-derivative action against,
inter alia, the new corporation and the majority shareholder asking for res-
cission of the asset transfer, and the "imposition of a constructive trust" on
the profits of the new corporation. 45 The minority shareholders alleged "un-
fair dealing and breaches of fiduciary duty [over a period of] several years,"
resulting in the lowering of the value of the old corporation's shares. 46 The
essential question in this case, according to the First District Court of Ap-
peal, is whether the appraisal rights statute prevented "judicial scrutiny of the
transfer of ... assets from" the old corporation to the new.47 The appellate
court answered that question in the negative and went on to hold that addi-
tional remedies, including rescission and "the imposition of a constructive
trust," may be available to the minority shareholders.4a The court observed
that it was the first Florida appellate court's duty "to interpret the governing
provision[], . . .section 607.1302" of the Florida Statutes, as amended in
2003.49 The First District Court of Appeal concluded that if minority share-
holders can "raise facially sufficient and serious allegations of unfairness,"
their relief would not be "limited to the statutory remedy of offering up their
shares for a fair price."50
Cassedy v. Alland Investments Corp.51 involved a demand for a corpo-
rate accounting.52 Alland Investments Corporation (Alland) was formed as a
Florida corporation for the purpose of buying Texas real estate and develop-
ing it.53 Mr. Cassedy invested $315,000 in the enterprise.54 The real estate
purchase was never completed and, at the end of June 1999, Mr. Cassedy
asked Alland for a full accounting.55 About a week later, Alland sent Mr.
42. Id. at 725.
43. Id.
44. See Williams, 977 So. 2d at 725.
45. Id. at 726.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 730-31.
49. Williams, 977 So. 2d at 727.
50. Id. at 724.
51. 982 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
52. Id. at 720.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
2008]
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Cassedy "a 'single page accounting summary"' attached to correspondence
to the effect that Alland had "'the rest of the year' to complete a compre-
hensive accounting. 56 Additional correspondence followed between the par-
ties that summer and, on August 18, 1999, Alland wrote to Mr. Cassedy stat-
ing that Mr. Cassedy had the summary since July 6, 1999, and that no pa-
perwork evidencing efforts to buy the real estate was ever sent to Alland.57
Alland was subsequently dissolved.58 On June 15, 2006, after the corpora-
tion had been dissolved, Mr. Cassedy filed suit seeking a final accounting.
59
Alland moved for summary judgment arguing that the action "was barred by
the statute of limitations because [it was] in 1999" and that Mr. Cassedy's
claim accrued.60 The trial court granted the motion, and Mr. Cassedy ap-
pealed.61 The First District Court of Appeal agreed with Alland in that, even
though the accounting action was an equitable action, the statute of limita-
tions did apply.62 However, regardless of whether the five-year contract sta-
tute of limitations contained in section 95.11 (2)(b) of the Florida Statutes is
applicable to written contracts or the four-year statute of limitations on oral
contract actions set forth in section 95.11(3)(k) of the Florida Statutes is
applied, Mr. Cassedy's suit was not barred.63 According to the First District
Court of Appeal, the statute of limitations did not start "to run in 1999 be-
cause there [was] no repudiation of the duty to provide a final accounting. '
IV. CHOICE OF LAW AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
The main issue in Lanoue v. Rizk 65 was whether the Ontario or the Flor-
ida statute of limitations controlled in an action brought by a lender against a
borrower.66 The borrower, while in Ontario, simultaneously signed a prom-
56. Cassedy, 982 So. 2d at 720.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Cassedy, 982 So. 2d at 720.
62. Id.
63. Id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 95.11(2)(b), (3)(k) (2008).
64. Id.
65. 987 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
66. Id. at 725. In addition to deciding the conflict of law issue, the Third District Court
of Appeal concluded that summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of the lender, as
there was an issue of fact regarding who made certain late payments. Id. at 727. For the
statute of limitations to be tolled under the Ontario statute, part payment must be made ."by
the person against whom the claim is made or by the person's agent."' Id. (quoting Limita-
tions Act, 2002 S.O., ch. 24, Sched. B, § 13(11)). The proceeds of the loan were to be used
for a restaurant located in Key Biscayne, Florida. Id. at 725. There were three borrowers: 1)
[Vol. 33
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issory note and a general security agreement which contained a description
of the collateral given as security for the loan.67 The general security agree-
ment (GSA) was referred to in the promissory note; the note providing that
"'[flor prepayment terms and special conditions," the GSA was to "be read
in conjunction with [the] note and all said terms shall apply to"' the note.""
The promissory note did not address the issue of choice of law, but the GSA
did.69 The choice of law provision in the GSA provided that "'the laws of
the Province of Ontario and the State of Miami"' would govern.7 ° The refer-
ence to "Miami" was determined by the trial judge to be a scrivener's error-
the State of Florida having been intended-and the Third District Court of
Appeal agreed.7' With that issue resolved, the Third District Court of Appeal
still had to choose between the law of Ontario and Florida; it chose Ontario.
72
Since the lawsuit was in Florida, Florida choice of law rules had to be con-
sulted first.73 For causes of action sounding in contract, Florida follows the
rule of lex loci contractus.74
V. CONSUMER RIGHTS
A. Deceptive Trade Practices
Auto leasing customers of S.D.S. Autos, Inc. (S.D.S.) and Brumos Mo-
tor Cars, Inc. (Brumos) brought a class action against S.D.S. and Brumos
under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA).7 5
Although the lessees had signed leases requiring arbitration and containing
express class action waivers, the trial court denied the motions of S.D.S. and
Brumos, and refused to dismiss the class action suit based on the arbitration
provision.76 The leases recited that they were governed by the Federal Arbi-
the appellant Lanoue; 2) a corporation that was dissolved prior to the lawsuit; and 3) a third
party who was not made a party to the lawsuit. Lanoue, 987 So. 2d at 725-26.
67. Id. at 726. The opinion does not make a reference to any "collateral" other than the
note. See id. at 725-27.
68. Id. at 726.
69. Id.
70. Lanoue, 987 So. 2d at 726.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 727.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing, among other cases, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So. 2d
1160, 1163 (Fla. 2006), noted in Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra note 1, at 41-43).
75. S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski (S.D.S. Autos 1), 976 So. 2d 600, 602 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
76. Id. at 603.
20081
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tration Act (FAA). 77 S.D.S. and Brumos appealed.78 The First District Court
of Appeal acknowledged that the FAA represents 'clear federal policy'
favoring arbitration, and that states cannot require persons who have con-
sented to arbitration to later resort to a lawsuit, except where contract de-
fenses would render the contractual provisions invalid under state law, 79 cit-
ing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Perry v. Thomas.8" The
First District also noted that the United States Supreme Court stated in Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd"' that arbitration agreements are to be 'rigo-
rously enforced."' 8 2 The First District expressed due regard for federal pro-
nouncements on the sanctity of arbitration agreements but observed that state
law may "invalidate an arbitration provision without [offending] the FAA
'[if] the law at issue governs contracts generally and not arbitration agree-
ments specifically.' "83 The First District Court of Appeal then reviewed the
remedial nature of FDUTPA and, affirming the order of the trial court, held
that barring auto leasing customers from pursuing class actions where each
claim might be small would frustrate the benefits and intent of FDUTPA.8
The class action waiver in this case was inconsistent with Florida's public
policy and therefore unenforceable.
In a related short per curiam decision on consolidated appeals by S.D.S.
and Brumos, the First District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's class
action certification in S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski (S.D.S. Autos J)86
under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(b)(2)-(b)(3) "of two classes of
consumers" covered by FDUTPA.87 The court cited its decision in Davis v.
Powertel, Inc.,88 where it held that:
[I]n a class action for damages under FDUTPA, class certification
does not require proof of each individual putative class member's
actual reliance on an alleged deceptive act because an actionable
deceptive trade practice is one which is "likely to deceive a con-
77. Id. at 604.
78. Id. at 603.
79. Id. at 605 (quoting Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221).
80. 482 U.S. at 483.
81. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
82. S.D.S. Autos 1, 976 So. 2d at 605 (quoting Perry, 482 U.S. at 490).
83. Id. (quoting Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1306 (1 1th Cir. 2002)).
84. Id. at 608, 611.
85. Id. at611.
86. 982 So. 2d I (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
87. Id. (citing Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(2)-(3)).
88. 776 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
[Vol. 33
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sumer acting reasonably in the same circumstances," not one upon
which any individual plaintiff "actually relied."
89
C. Warranties
Larrain and Sotomayor (Buyers) bought a 2001 Ford Expedition from
Bengal Motor Co. Ltd. (Bengal Motor) in 2005.90 As part of the transaction,
the Buyers were given a limited warranty for the car.91 They signed a sepa-
rate agreement with Bengal Motor to arbitrate any disputes that might arise
from the dealings between Bengal Motor and the purchasers. 92 The automo-
bile was allegedly defective and Bengal Motor did not successfully repair it
during the term of the warranty.93 Larrain and Sotomayor then sued Bengal
Motor alleging, among other things, violation of warranties under the Mag-
nuson-Moss Warranty Act.94 The trial court granted Bengal Motor's motions
to compel arbitration, and Larrain and Sotomayor appealed. 9 The Third
District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.96 The Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act and the "single document rule," adopted by the Federal Trade
Commission, recognize that the parties may agree to alternate dispute resolu-
tion, but language to this effect must be in the same document as any warran-
ty extended. 97 The "single document rule" was not satisfied as there were
two documents here, the warranty and the arbitration agreement.98
89. S.D.S. Autos II, 982 So. 2d at 1 (quoting Davis, 776 So. 2d at 974).
90. Larrain v. Bengal Motor Co., 976 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
91. Id.
92. Id. The agreement provided that arbitration applied to any claim, including claims of
the purchaser and the dealer arising "from a 'relationship with third parties who do not sign'
the agreement. Id. Could those nonparties be compelled to arbitrate? Could those nonparties
compel the parties to arbitrate? If so, under what circumstances? See McCarthy v. Azure, 22
F.3d 351, 361-63 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that a nonparty to an arbitration agreement cannot
compel a party to the agreement to arbitrate); Charter Air Ctr., Inc. v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 614,
616-17 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a non-signatory, under the agency excep-
tion, is not bound by an arbitration agreement when it is signed in his or her official capacity).
93. Larrain, 976 So. 2d at 13.
94. Id. at 13-14.
95. Id. at 14.
96. Id. at 14-15.
97. Larrain, 976 So. 2d at 14.
98. See id.
2008]
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VI. CONTRACTS
A. Formation
In this offer and acceptance case, Mr. Dougherty, an attorney,
represented both "his mother, Kathleen Dougherty, and his fiancde's solely-
owned corporation, Franklin Pond, Inc." (the buyers)." Specifically, Mr.
Dougherty had section 1031 like-kind exchange funds that had to be used for
the purchase of other real estate. l 0 Mr. Dougherty had dealt with Mr. and
Mrs. Ricci before, and he knew the Riccis were trying to sell certain real
estate.10 ' After Mr. Dougherty contacted Mr. Ricci, Mr. Ricci showed up at
Mr. Dougherty's office with "a proposed contract" for the sale of their real
estate for 1.5 million dollars.10 2 The proposed contract, an offer, had already
been signed by Mr. and Mrs. Ricci.10 3 Mr. Dougherty made some changes to
the proposed contract, inserted the names of the buyers, signed and initialed
the agreement on their behalf, as buyers, and arranged for the earnest money
deposit to be made to Mr. Ricci.' 4 Mr. Ricci also initialed the changes. 5
When Mr. and Mrs. Ricci did not close the sale after they had been asked,
and failed to cure a title defect, the buyers brought an action against Mr. and
Mrs. Ricci seeking specific performance."° The action was dismissed, and
the buyers appealed.0 7 The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed. °8 A
contract for the purchase of real estate that could be specifically enforced did
not come into being. 9 The changes Mr. Dougherty made to the proposed
contract amounted to a counteroffer to Mr. and Mrs. Ricci."0 Mr. Ricci
agreed to the counteroffer, but Mrs. Ricci did not."' The court found no
support for the buyers' "argument that Mr. Ricci had.., apparent authority
99. Franklin Pond, Inc. v. Ricci, 979 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Franklin Pond, Inc., 979 So. 2d at 388.
105. Id.
106. Id. At this point, Mr. Dougherty had become one of the buyers, his mother having
assigned to him her interest under "the purported contract." Id.
107. Id. at 387.
108. Franklin Pond, Inc., 979 So. 2d at 389.
109. See id.
110. Id. at388.
111. Id.
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to act on" Mrs. Ricci's behalf to accept the counteroffer, and there was no
evidence that Mrs. Ricci ratified the changes and Mr. Ricci's actions.'
12
B. Remedies
Mastec, Inc. v. TJS, L.L. C.113 involved a complicated fact pattern con-
cerning a protracted real estate sale transaction, title defects, construction of
a Florida Association of Realtors preprinted form VAC-6 10/00 and
amendments to the form, numerous extensions, and subsequent attempted
extensions of the closing date." 4 The trial court decided that Mastec, Inc.
(Seller) breached the contract and granted the request by TJS, L.L.C., and
Lakeland Granite and Marble, Inc. (Buyers) for specific performance." 5 The
Seller appealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal held that as pro-
vided in the contract, 1 6 time was of the essence, the real estate contract expi-
ration date was February 15, 2004, and "the [c]ontract called for concurrent
performances by the" Buyers and Seller."7 Actually tendering payment to
the Seller and demanding conveyance of title by Seller, were conditions
precedent to ordering specific performance." 8 The trial court did not make
any finding that there had been a tender prior to February 15, 2004, nor, said
the Second District Court of Appeal, could the trial court have so found on
the evidence presented. " 9 There having been no tender, the Seller was not
obligated to convey.
20
112. Id. at 388-89. The trial court's finding that Mr. Dougherty did not have the required
express authority to act on behalf of the buyers provided additional support for the Fifth Dis-
trict's affirmance of the trial court's dismissal of the action against the Riccis. Franklin Pond,
Inc., 979 So. 2d at 389. Ratification by the other buyers of Mr. Dougherty's acts was not
discussed. Id. It would appear that the result would have been the same even if the buyers
had ratified Mr. Dougherty's acts, since the appellate court found no acceptance of the counte-
roffer by Mrs. Ricci. See id. at 388-89.
113. 979 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
114. Id. at 286-89.
115. Id.at290-91.
116. Id. at 292. The Second District Court of Appeal made at least two references to the
fact that "[t]he 'time is of the essence' provision" was in bold print. Id. at 286 n.3.
117. Mastec, 979 So. 2d at 292.
118. See id. at 292 (citing Booth v. Bobbitt, 114 So. 513, 514 (Fla. 1927)).
119. See id.
120. See id.
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C. Right of First Refusal
Old Port Cove Condominium Ass'n One v. Old Port Cove Holdings,
Inc. (Old Port 1),121 involving a right of first refusal, and reviewed in the
2006-2007 Survey, 2 2 made its way to the Supreme Court of Florida. 13 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal had ruled that the common law rule against
perpetuities had been retroactively abrogated by section 689.225 of the Flor-
ida Statutes-the developer having argued that the rule applied to the right of
first refusal at issue-with the result that the right of first refusal was upheld
as against the developer. 2 4 The Fourth District acknowledged that its abro-
gation holding put it in conflict with Fallschase Development Corp. v. Bla-
key, 2 5 and it certified the question. 12 6 In addition, the Fourth District indi-
cated that it had some doubt as to whether the rule against perpetuities ap-
plied to the right of first refusal in the first place, but the Fourth District did
not decide that issue because of its determination as to the abrogation of the
common law rule against perpetuities. 27 The Supreme Court of Florida, as a
matter of first impression, held that "the rule against perpetuities does not
apply to rights of first refusal.', 128 The Supreme Court of Florida also ruled
that section 689.225 of the Florida Statutes did not have retroactive effect. 29
The Court thereby affirmed the Fourth District Court of Appeal as to result,
while agreeing with the First District in Fallschase that section 689.225 of
the Florida Statutes did not have retroactive effect. 130 Fallschase was disap-
proved "to the extent it [found] that the common law rule [against perpetui-
ties] applie[d] to rights of first refusal.' 3' Instead, rights of first refusal are
to be "analyzed under the rule [against] unreasonable restraints on aliena-
tion."
132
121. 954 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
122. Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra note 1, at 65.
123. See Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc. v. Old Port Cove Condo. Ass'n One (Old Port II),
986 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 2008).
124. See id. at 1281.
125. 696 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
126. Old Port 1, 954 So. 2d at 746-47.
127. See id. at 743-44.
128. Old Port 11, 986 So. 2d at 1281.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1288.
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D. Exculpatory Clauses
The Applegates' daughter, age five, was injured at camp while partici-
pating in a water skiing wakeboard activity. 33 The Applegates had signed a
liability exculpatory agreement on behalf of their daughter and themselves.'34
The Applegates sued Cable Water Ski, L.C. (Cable), the operator of the
camp, for negligence and sought damages for injury to their daughter, and
included a loss of services claim in the complaint. 35 The trial court awarded
summary judgment to Cable finding that the exculpatory clause was an un-
ambiguous waiver of the claims by the Applegates.'36 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Cable with re-
spect to the Applegates' loss of services claim, which was not contested on
appeal. 37 The Fifth District Court of Appeal noted that exculpatory agree-
ments are not looked at favorably by the law on public policy grounds
When a minor is the subject of a liability exculpatory clause favoring a
commercial enterprise, Florida-as parens patriae-has "a strong intent to
protect children from harm."'39 Consequently, the appellate court concluded
that the exculpatory clause was unenforceable for reasons of public policy. 40
However, in so deciding, the court emphasized that its ruling was "limited to
commercial enterprises.' 4' The court certified the following question to the
Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public importance: "WHETHER A
CONTRACT CONTAINING AN EXCULPATORY CLAUSE, SIGNED
BY A PARENT ON BEHALF OF HER CHILD, IN FAVOR OF A
COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE, IS ENFORCEABLE TO DEFEAT THE
CHILD'S ACTION TO RECOVER FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
SUSTAINED BY THE CHILD AS A RESULT OF THE ENTERPRISE'S
NEGLIGENCE."1 42 The court also went to some lengths to explain its view
that the public policy result might have been different had the defendant been
a "not-for-profit, community-based organization."
'143
133. Applegate v. Cable Water Ski, L.C., 974 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Applegate, 974So. 2dat 1114.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1115.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1116.
143. Applegate, 974 So. 2d at 1115-16.
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E. Limitation of Damages
The Second District Court of Appeals set out in detail the facts of Paul
Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps S. Corp. 4 Briefly stated, Alps South Corp. (Alps)
made medical devices and Paul Gottlieb & Co. (Gottlieb) supplied special
fabric to Alps. 14' Alps incorporated the fabric into the liners it made for use
by amputees with prosthetic devices) 46 Although Alps' customers were
pleased with the new liners, it was not long before the situation changed.
47
After Gottlieb provided different fabric to Alps without Alps' consent, Alps
began to get complaints from its customers.'48 Alps' and Gottlieb's relation-
ship worsened. 4 9 Alps did not pay a bill from Gottlieb, and Gottlieb sued
Alps. 50 Alps filed a counterclaim for damages alleging breach of warran-
ty.' 5' Gottlieb was awarded nearly $29,000 in damages on its claim for non-
payment. 52 The damage award to Alps on its counterclaim was almost
$695,000, consisting mainly of lost profits, and Gottlieb appealed. 53 The
Second District Court of Appeal characterized the case as a "'battle of the
forms."",154 The back of Gottlieb's finished goods contract provided that
"BUYER SHALL NOT IN ANY EVENT BE ENTITLED TO, AND
SELLER SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR INDIRECT OR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY NATURE, INCLUDING,
WITHOUT BEING LIMITED TO, LOSS OF PROFIT, PROMOTIONAL
OR MANUFACTURING EXPENSES, INJURY TO REPUTATION OR
LOSS OF CUSTOMER.' ' 55 The Alps purchase order did not contain the
liability limitations of the Gottlieb contract. 56 As the court noted, "[t]his
dispute arises from the common, but risky, commercial practice where the
seller and buyer negotiate a contract involving goods by exchanging each
others' standardized forms.' 57 However, section 672.207 of the Florida
Statutes, contained in Florida's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, is
144. Paul Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps S. Corp., 985 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 3-4.
148. Id. at 4.
149. Gottlieb, 985 So. 2d at 4.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Exactly $633,939.04 of the award represented lost profit. Gottlieb, 985 So. 2d at
9.
154. See id. at 5.
155. Id. at4.
156. See id. at 5-6.
157. Id. at 4.
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supposed to resolve the issue of differing forms used between merchants that
cover the same transaction.' Specifically, a contract between merchants
can be formed despite an acceptance that contains new or modified terms,
even though a contract may not have been formed under the "common law
mirror image rule.' ' 159 Under section 672.207(2) of the Florida Statutes, ad-
ditional terms, for example, Gottlieb's damage limitation clause, "become a
part of the contract unless:" 1) acceptance is limited, by the express terms of
the offer, to the terms of the offer; or 2) the additional terms result in a ma-
terial alteration of the contract; or 3) notice of objection to the additional
terms "has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after no-
tice of [the additional terms] is received. '16° The Second District determined
that under the facts of the case, the only issue to be decided was whether the
Gottlieb damages limitation clause constituted a material alteration of the
contract. 161 Alps, as the party seeking to exclude from the contract the dam-
ages limitation clause-which it admitted it had not read at the time-had
the burden of proving a material alteration. t6 To carry its burden, Alps had
to demonstrate that the damages limitation clause had the effect of causing it
unreasonable "surprise or hardship."'163 As to surprise, the Gottlieb contract
with the damages limitation clause "was the sixth in a series" of contracts
between the parties, all of which contracts had the clause, and thus, Alps did
not carry its burden of proof as to surprise. 64 As to hardship, Alps failed to
inform Gottlieb of major ramifications of Gottlieb's breach of contract, thus
not indicating any severe economic hardship. 165 Alps did not meet its burden
of proving hardship."6 Gottlieb's limitation of damages clause was a part of
the contract.167  Therefore, Alps could not recover lost profits or other con-
sequential damages.' 68 However, Alps could recover direct "benefit-of-the-
bargain" damages and incidental damages. 69 The case was reversed and
remanded for the determination of Alps' direct and incidental damages. 7'
158. Gottlieb, 985 So. 2d at 5-6.
159. IM at 6.
160. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 672.207(2) (2007)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 6-7.
163. Gottlieb, 985 So. 2d at 7.
164. Id. at 7-8.
165. Id. at8.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. Gottlieb, 985 So. 2d at 10.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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F. Attorney's Fees - Prevailing Party
Padula & Wadsworth Construction, Inc. (Contractor) hired Port-A-
Weld, Inc. (Subcontractor), and the subcontract between them contained a
relatively unique attorney's fees provision.' 7' In addition to providing that
the party that did not prevail would be liable for all attorney's fees and court
costs of the prevailing party, the clause provided that "a party shall not be
considered as a 'prevailing party' if its recovery shall be less than 75% of its
claim amount."1 72 The subcontractor sued the contractor, alleging nonpay-
ment of the balance due under the subcontract, and a claim for attorney's
fees and court costs were included. 73 The contractor filed a compulsory
counterclaim. 174 The trial court ruled that the contractor prevailed as to the
subcontractor's claim and the subcontractor prevailed on the contractor's
compulsory counterclaim. 175 The trail court said that "attorney's fees for
both sides, [were] a wash"'' 76 Appeals followed, and the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, in Port-A-Weld, Inc. v. Padula & Wadsworth Construction,
Inc., ' 77 reversed the trial court's decision as to attorney's fees and costs. 78
Since "compulsory counterclaims are not, . . .as a matter of law," claims
distinct from the main claim, there cannot, where there is a compulsory
counterclaim be more than one winner; "one party must prevail.' 79 The
court rejected the idea that there could be a tie in an action for breach of con-
tract. 80 Thus, under the Supreme Court of Florida's test in Moritz v. Hoyt
Enterprises, Inc.,181 the prevailing party is the one in fact winning on the
significant issues.12 Finding that the subcontractor won on the significant
issues before the trial court, the Fourth District pointed out that the inquiry
could not end there in light of the seventy-five percent requirement in the
subcontract.'83 The question presented was "whether the 'significant issue'
test" under Moritz can be modified contractually.' 4 The court noted that
171. Port-A-Weld, Inc. v. Padula & Wadsworth Constr., Inc., 984 So. 2d 564, 566, 568-69
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
172. Id. at 567-68.
173. Id. at 566.
174. Id. at 569.
175. Id. at 568.
176. Port-A-Weld, 984 So. 2d at 568.
177. Id. at 564.
178. Id. at 566.
179. Id. at 569.
180. Id.
181. 604 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1992).
182. Id. at 810.
183. Port-A-Weld, 984 So. 2d at 569.
184. Id.
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depending on how it was determined, the subcontractor may have been a
sixty percent winner or it may have been a more than eighty percent win-
ner.185 Was "the contractual 75% threshold in" the subcontract enforceable
or was it "contrary to public policy?"'86 Calling it "a matter of first impres-
sion," the court determined that the Supreme Court of Florida's "significant
issue" test cannot be altered by contract. 187 The Fourth District agreed with
the Fifth District Court of Appeal in P & C Thompson Bros. Construction
Co. v. Rowe 88 that a provision under which a party may actually prevail but
yet has to pay the other party's attorney's fee "can be seen as" against public
policy. 89 In addition, the attorney's fee reciprocity statute, section 57.105(7)
of the Florida Statutes, was cited by the court as additional support for the
conclusion that the seventy-five percent winner provision in the subcontract
was against public policy.' 9° The subcontractor was entitled to recover fees
and costs.'9'
In M.A. Hajianpour, M.D., P.A. v. Khosrow Maleki, P.A.,' 92 decided
two months before Port-A-Weld, the Fourth District Court of Appeal found
that the parties had "battled to a draw" and concluded that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by refusing to award attorney's fees under a prevail-
ing party provision where the "court determine[d] that neither party pre-
vailed."'193 Hajianpour is not mentioned in Port-A-Weld.'94
In another attorney's fee case, Skylark Sports, L.L.C. (the tenant) ob-
tained a judgment against Islander Beach Club Condominium (the landlord)
based on a lease dispute. 95 The trial court awarded attorney fees and costs to
the tenant of approximately $192,000 based on the following provision in the
lease: "ATTORNEY'S FEES: In the event that either party incurs legal fees
or costs in the enforcement of this Lease or any provision hereof, whether
185. Id. at570.
186. Id. at569.
187. Id. at 569-70.
188. 433 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
189. Id. at 1389.
190. Port-A-Weld, 984 So. 2d at 569-70. Section 57.105(7) of the Florida Statutes pro-
vides, with respect to contracts entered into after October 1, 1988, "[i]f a contract contains a
provision allowing attorney's fees to a party when he or she is required to take any action to
enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney's fees to the other party
when that party prevails in any action." FLA. STAT. § 57.105(7) (2008).
191. Port-A-Weld, 984 So. 2d at 570.
192. 975 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
193. Id. at 1290 (citing Merchs. Bonding Co. v. City of Melbourne, 832 So. 2d 184, 186
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
194. See generally Port-A-Weld, 984 So. 2d at 564.
195. Islander Beach Club Condo. v. Skylark Sports, L.L.C., 975 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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suit is filed or not, shall be entitled to recover and to receive payment of rea-
sonable attorneys' [fees] and costs incurred by the other party."' 96 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal reversed the fee award because the court found that
the fee provision "clearly makes no sense."' ' The provision did "not reflect
any clear intention... as to whom, when, and how attorney's fees or costs
should be allowed."'98 The trial court's reading into and rewriting the clause
so as "to make it a prevailing party" clause was improper, as was its interpre-
tation of the word "by" as meaning "from."'"
G. Action Against State
ContractPoint Florida Parks, L.L.C. (ContractPoint) "entered into a
concessions" contract with the Florida Department of Environmental Protec-
tion (DEP).2°° DEP had legislative authority to make the contract.2"1 Even-
tually, ContractPoint sued DEP for breach of contract.2 2 ContractPoint won
the lawsuit and was awarded damages exceeding $600,000.203 DEP raised
section 11.066 of the Florida Statutes as a bar to enforcement of the judg-
ment.2' Specifically, DEP relied on section 11.066(3) which reads in part
that "[n]either the state nor any of its agencies shall pay or be required to pay
monetary damages under the judgment of any court except pursuant to an
appropriation made by law." 205 The trial court ruled in DEP's favor but the
First District Court of Appeal reversed, certifying the following question to
the Supreme Court of Florida:
DOES SECTION 11.066, FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLY
WHERE JUDGMENTS HAVE BEEN ENTERED AGAINST
THE STATE OR ONE OF ITS AGENCIES IN A CONTRACT
ACTION?, ,2°
196. Id. at 1209 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 1211.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, L.L.C., 986 So. 2d 1260, 1262
(Fla. 2008).
201. Id. at 1263.
202. Id. at 1262.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LL C., 986 So. 2d at 1265 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 11.066(3)
(2008)).
206. Id. at 1261-62.
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The Supreme Court of Florida answered the question in the negative finding
that section 11.066 of the Florida Statutes was intended to apply to judg-
ments against the state in the "exercise of its police powers [citing] the Citrus
Canker Eradication Program,' '207 and not to judgments resulting from con-
tract actions. 8 The Court noted that its decision in Pan-Am Tobacco Corp.
v. Department of Corrections2°9 predated the legislative enactment of section
11.066.210 The Court opined that, in Pan-Am Tobacco Corp., with respect to
legislatively approved contracts, the legislature intended that they be binding
on private parties, the state, and "entities of the state., 21  Being deprived of
the means to judicially enforce a judgment for breach of contract renders the
contract illusory. 2  As a matter of first impression, the Court held "that sec-
tion 11.066 was not intended to and does not apply to valid judgments aris-
ing from the breach of a legislatively authorized express, written contract by
the State or any of its agencies. 213 Justice Wells, joined by Justices Cantero
and Bell, dissented.214
VII. DEEDS AND TAx SALES, MORTGAGES, LIs PENDENS, AND PARTITION
A. Deeds and Tax Sales
In Jones v. Flowers,1 5 the United States Supreme Court held that when
a taxing authority mails a notice of a real estate tax sale and the notice is
returned to it unclaimed, due process requires the taxing authority to "take
additional, reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the" owner of the
property to be sold.216 The Jones decision was controlling in Patricia Wein-
garten Associates, Inc. v. Jocalbro, Inc.17 The Marion County Clerk sent
notices to Patricia Weingarten Associates, Inc. (Weingarten) of real estate
tax sales for failure to pay real estate taxes with respect to fourteen parcels of
real estate.2 " As required by section 197.522(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes,
207. Id. at 1267.
208. Id. at 1266-67 (citing Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d
774, 785 (Fla. 2004)).
209. 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984).
210. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, L.L.C., 986 So. 2d at 1268.
211. Id. (quoting Pan-Am Tobacco Corp., 471 So. 2d at 5).
212. Id. at 1270.
213. Id. at 1272.
214. Id. at 1272-79 (Wells, J., dissenting).
215. 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
216. Id. at 225.
217. 974 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
218. Id.
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notices were sent to Weingarten "by certified mail with return receipt re-
quested."2 9 The notices were sent "to four different addresses" and all of the
notices were returned unclaimed.22° The Marion County Clerk then "pub-
lish[ed] the notice of the application for tax deeds" on the property.22' The
notice was published in a local newspaper of general circulation as required
by statute.222 No response from Weingarten to the published notices was
received by the Clerk and "tax deeds were issued" to Jocalbro, Inc. (Jocal-
bro) for Weingarten's parcels. 2 3 Weingarten had previously given notice to
the Marion County Tax Collector of its current Missouri address.224 In fact,
the Marion County Tax Collector sent to Weingarten, at its correct Missouri
address, tax bills for other Marion County property owned by Weingarten.225
Jocalbro successfully brought an action against Weingarten to quiet title to
the property. 6 Weingarten appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded.227 The notice of the tax sale, as provided, did not
satisfy the due process requirements under Jones.228 Publishing notice of the
sale in a local newspaper was inadequate under the circumstances. 29 Once
the notices were returned to the clerk as unclaimed, it was incumbent on the
clerk to take additional, reasonable steps to give adequate notice as required
under Jones.30
In a slightly later case, South Investment Properties, Inc. v. Icon Invest-
ments L.L. C,231 the Fifth District Court of Appeal reached a different result
on facts similar to the facts of Patricia Weingarten Associates, Inc. 32 What
were the factual differences that distinguished South Investment Properties,
Inc. from Patricia Weingarten Associates, Inc.? In South Investment Proper-
ties, Inc., the property owner, Icon Investments, changed its address, but did
not give notice to the property appraiser.233 In addition, no forwarding ad-
dress was given to the post office. 34 The clerk of court mailed tax sale no-
219. ld. at 562.
220. Id. at 563.
221. Id. at 564.
222. Patricia Weingarten Assocs., 974 So. 2d at 564.
223. Id. at 561.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Patricia Weingarten Assocs., 974 So. 2d at 561.
228. Id. at 561, 565.
229. Id. at 564.
230. Id. at 563-64 (citing Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 225 (2006)).
231. 988 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
232. Id. at 1118.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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tices to Icon Investments by certified mail, return receipt requested, at the
last address of Icon Investments known to the property appraiser. 5 In this
case, someone, but not the owner, signed for the certified mail and receipts
were returned to the clerk.236 The clerk also published notice in the appropri-
ate newspaper, and the sheriff posted notice at the property address known to
it.237 The notice given satisfied due process in this case.238
B. Mortgages
Alma O'Connell, her son, and O'Con Manufacturing, Inc., a company
owned by them, borrowed $825,000 from Union Planters Bank-now Re-
gions Bank-and gave the bank a promissory note (Note 1) secured by Alma
O'Connell's guaranty and "a security interest in the assets of her compa-
ny. ' ,239 She then borrowed another $400,000 from the bank.24° For this loan,
she gave the bank another promissory note (Note 2) and Note 2 "was secured
by a mortgage on real [estate she] owned."' 1 The mortgage was recorded
and referenced as Note 2.242 Note 2 contained what is known as a "dragnet
clause. 243 The dragnet clause not only referred to the mortgage as securing
the $400,000 loan, but also as security for "any other liabilities, indebtedness
or obligations of [O'Connell] to [Regions] Bank, however or whenever
created."'244 This language is broad enough to include Note 1.245 Note 2 was
not recorded and did not refer to Note 1.246 Starlines International Corp.
(Starlines) bought a fifty percent interest in the mortgaged real estate from
Alma O'Connell.247 Starlines read Note 2, which contained the dragnet
clause, and apparently asked Alma O'Connell if there was any pre-existing
debt owed to the bank.248 According to Starlines, she said "no." 249 Starlines
235. Id.
236. S. Inv. Props., Inc., 988 So. 2d at 1118.
237. Id. at 1116.
238. Id. at 1118.
239. Starlines Int'l Corp. v. Union Planters Bank, 976 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2008).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1173-74.
242. Id. at 1174.
243. Id.
244. Starlines Int'l Corp., 976 So. 2d at 1174.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1176.
247. Id. at 1174.
248. Id. at 1177.
249. Starlines Int'l Corp., 976 So. 2d at 1177.
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did not inquire of "the [b]ank as to the existence of a pre-existing debt".
After default on Note 1, the bank foreclosed its mortgage. 251 As a result,
Starlines lost its equity in the property.252 Starlines' position in the trial court
was that "its interest in the ... property was superior to that of the [b]ank. 253
It was "a subsequent purchaser without notice" of Note 1.254 The trial court
entered summary judgment for the bank finding that the mortgage secured
Note 1 because of the dragnet clause in Note 2.255 The trial court reasoned
that the mortgage itself was recorded, and it referred to Note 2, which placed
Starlines on "inquiry notice" of Note 1.256 Thus, the trial court found that
Starlines had notice and its interest was not superior to the bank's interest. 57
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal aligned itself with the Third
District Court of Appeal in United National Bank v. Tellam,258 finding the
rule in Tellam to be the appropriate rule to apply when the issue presented
involves the enforcement of a dragnet clause against a person who is not the
borrower.2 59 The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, in Tellam, held that in order for a dragnet clause to be
enforceable with respect to pre-existing obligations and debts, the clause
must "specifically identif[y] by name" the debt or obligations secured.26°
The Fourth District, however, noted that there is an exception to the specific-
ity requirement of Tellam.6 If "it can be shown that the third party other-
wise had notice that the specific pre-existing debt at issue was to be included
within the grasp of the dragnet clause," the clause will be enforced.262 The
Fourth District acknowledged that it had upheld dragnet clauses263 as against
borrowers, but not, as here, as against a third party. 264 The summary judg-
ment was reversed because of the existence of an issue of fact: Whether
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1173.
252. Id. at 1176.
253. Id. at 1175.
254. Starlines Int'l Corp., 976 So. 2d at 1175.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 644 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
259. Starlines Int'l Corp., 976 So. 2d at 1176.
260. Id. at 1175 (citing United Nat'l Bank v. Tellam, 644 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
261. Id. at 1176.
262. Id.
263. See generally Robert C. Roy Agency, Inc. v. Sun First Nat'l Bank of Palm Beach,
468 So. 2d 399, 400 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
264. Starlines Int'l Corp., 976 So. 2d at 1176.
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Starlines had implied actual notice of Note 1, there having been "no express
actual notice.
265
C. Lis Pendens
Watermark Marina of Palm City, L.L.C. (Watermark), as buyer, and the
Nickersons, as seller, entered into a contract for purchase and sale of real
estate.266 When the Nickersons did not close on the sale, Watermark sued
them seeking specific performance.267 Watermark filed a notice of lis pen-
dens, and the trial court required a $200,000 bond to be filed by Water-
mark.268 When the lis pendens expired, Watermark did not extend it.269 Wa-
termark then requested that the bond be discharged and that Watermark be
permitted to substitute corporate stock to cover payment of damages, if any,
to the Nickersons for damages found to have resulted from the prior record-
ing of the lis pendens. 2o The Nickersons objected to the substitution, but the
trial court allowed it." Certiorari review was sought by the Nickersons 2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the writ and quashed the lower
court order that allowed the substitution of the stock for the lis pendens
bond.273 The court agreed with the Nickersons that section 48.23(3) of the
Florida Statutes, as implemented by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.610(b), required a bond.274 The statute "allow[s] courts to control notices
of lis pendens as injunctions" and under the rule a bond is required before a
temporary injunction may be granted. 5 The trial court's decision to require
a bond in the first place is a matter of discretion.276 But once the trial court
exercises its discretion to require a bond, a bond must be posted.277 "A
pledge of collateral simply is not a bond." 8 Judge Polen dissented, and
would not have granted certiorari.279
265. Id. at 1177.
266. Nickerson v. Watermark Marina of Palm City, L.L.C., 978 So. 2d 187, 188-89 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
267. Id. at 189.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. lId
271. Nickerson, 978 So. 2d at 189.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 190.
274. Id.
275. See id.
276. Nickerson, 978 So. 2d at 190.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 191 (Polen, J., dissenting).
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How strong does a litigant's claim to real property have to be to support
maintenance of a lis pendens placed on the subject property?280 That was the
question considered by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Nu-Vision,
L.L.C. v. Corporate Convenience, Inc.281 Corporate Convenience, Inc. (les-
sor) entered into a commercial lease agreement with Nu-Vision, L.L.C. (les-
see). 2  Prior to the execution of the lease agreement, the lessee sent the les-
sor a letter that contemplated a purchase of the property by the lessee.283 The
letter went on to say that "'a contract will follow"' if the letter was signed by
both of the parties.284 The letter was signed by both parties, but a contract
never followed.285 The parties signed the lease agreement, which had only
"one oblique reference" to a possible purchase of the leased property by the
lessee, and a contract for sale and purchase was never made between the
parties. 28' The lessor sued the lessee for eviction based on nonpayment of
rent.287 The lessee counterclaimed for specific performance based on its
"purchase option" agreement, and the lessee filed a notice of lis pendens
against the real estate.288 The lessor moved to discharge the lis pendens and
its motion was granted. 289 The lessee petitioned for certiorari review of the
dissolution of the lis pendens.29° Certiorari was denied.291 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal noted that a writing signed by the person to be charged
292
and containing essential terms for the sale and purchase of real estate, was
required to support an action for specific performance. 293 All the lessee had
was a letter naming the parties, with the address of the property, "and a slid-
ing scale for the purchase price., 294 The majority of the court found those
elements "insufficient to support [an action] for specific performance. 295
280. See generally Nu-Vision, L.L.C. v. Corporate Convenience, Inc., 965 So. 2d 232
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
281. Id. at 232, 234.
282. Id. at 233.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Nu-Vision, L.L.C., 965 So. 2d at 233-34.
286. Id. at 233-34.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 234.
289. Id. at 233.
290. Nu-Vision, L.LC., 965 So. 2d at 233.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 234 (citing De Vaux v. Westwood Baptist Church, 953 So. 2d 677, 681 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). De Vaux was reviewed in Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra note 1, at
55-56.
293. Nu-Vision, LLC., 965 So. 2d. at 234.
294. Id. at 234-35.
295. Id. at 235.
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Since the lessee's counterclaim for specific performance failed to state a
claim on which relief could be granted, lessee failed, as a matter of law, to
"'establish a fair nexus between the apparent legal or equitable ownership of
the property and the [underlying] dispute [described] in the lawsuit.'" 296 Fair
nexus requires a "'good faith, viable claim. ,, 297 The claim here failed to pass
that test.298 The majority said it would be unfair and "contrary ... to public
policy to allow" flimsy claims to support lis pendens. 299 Judge Thompson
dissented.300 He would have quashed the lower court's order based on Chi-
usolo v. Kennedy. °1
In Shields v. Schuman, °2 one of several additional lis pendens cases de-
cided during the survey period,3°3 Shields was a twenty-five percent share-
holder in a corporation that owned certain real estate. ° Schuman owned the
remaining seventy-five percent of the stock in the corporation.0 5 Schuman
caused the corporation to enter into a contract to sell the real estate to Blue
Water VII, L.L.C. (Blue Water), despite the fact that Shields objected.30 6
Shields sought to enjoin the consummation of the sale claiming that the price
was not high enough.3 7 A notice of lis pendens was also filed by Shields.30 8
Posting of a bond of $8,500,000 was required by the trial court as a condition
"to maintain the lis pendens." 309 The bond was not posted, which resulted in
the dissolution of the lis pendens. 310 Blue Water then sought dismissal of
two counts of the complaint, claiming there was a cloud on Blue Water's
title.3" Blue Water requested, as an alternative, that Shields be required to
post a bond to maintain the two counts.312 The trial court, although reluctant
296. Id. at 234 (quoting Chiusolo v. Kennedy, 614 So. 2d 491, 492 (Fla. 1993)).
297. Id. (quoting Bergmann v. Slater, 922 So. 2d 1110, 1112 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006)).
298. Nu-Vision, L.L.C., 965 So. 2d at 234.
299. Id. at 235.
300. Id. at 236 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
301. Id. (relying on Chiusolo, 614 So. 2d at 493).
302. 964 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
303. See, e.g., Real Invs., L.L.C. v. Oaks Group, Inc., 973 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2008); Suarez v. KMD Constr., Inc., 965 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
304. Shields, 964 So. 2d at 813.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 813-14.
308. Id. at 814.
309. Shields, 964 So. 2d at 814.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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to do so, required Shields to post bond if he wished to continue the lawsuit. 1 3
Shields filed a petition for certiorari." 4 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
granted the writ and the order requiring bond was quashed.3"5 The trial
court's order requiring a bond "not related to a lis pendens, violate[d]
[Shields's] constitutional right of access to the courts. 316
D. Partition
Brothers Nick and Peter Geraci owned approximately 290 acres of real
estate in Hillsborough County described as "ripe for development. '317 The
brothers did not get along; Peter wanted out of the business relationship, and
eventually, Peter sued Nick alleging that the real estate "was not divisible
without prejudice to the owners" and sought an order directing that the prop-
erty be sold.318 Nick denied that the real estate was indivisible and counter-
claimed seeking the appointment of three commissioners pursuant to section
64.061(1) of the Florida Statutes for the purpose of effectuating the parti-
tion.319 Instead, the trial court held "an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the property could be [partitioned] without prejudice to either broth-
er. ' 320 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that the real es-
tate could not be partitioned and a public sale of the real estate was or-
dered. 32' Nick appealed arguing that the trial court was required to appoint
commissioners who would make the call as to whether the real estate could
be divided in kind without prejudice to the parties, citing sections 64.061(1)
and 64.071(1) of the Florida Statutes.322 Describing the case as "a matter of
first impression, 323 the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court on the strength of section 64.061(4) of the Florida Statutes.324 The
Second District Court of Appeal held that section 64.061(4) allowed the trial
court to bypass the appointment of commissioners process and go directly to
313. Id. at 813-14.
314. Shields, 964 So. 2d at 813.
315. Id. at 814.
316. Id.
317. Geraci v. Geraci, 963 So. 2d 904, 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 905-06.
322. Geraci, 963 So. 2d at 907.
323. Id. at 905.
324. Id. at 907.
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the issue of whether the property could be divided in kind without prejudice
to the parties.325
VIII. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Condemnation
The Florida Department of Transportation (DOT), in connection with
"the widening of State Road 40 west of Ocala," filed a suit seeking to con-
demn part of the real estate owned by System Components Corporation (Sys-
tem Components).326 System Components then purchased additional real
estate on which to build a new facility and, in the interim, leased space to
which it temporarily relocated the business.327 DOT and System Compo-
nents agreed on everything but the proper calculation of damages to the
business pursuant to section 73.071(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes.325 System
Components argued that damages were measured by "the total value of the
business" on the date of taking-as if the company no longer existed.329
DOT's position was that the measure of damages was "actual damages" less,
or mitigated by, value that could be attributed to "the relocation and conti-
nu[ed] operation of the business. '330 The trial court instructed the jury to
make both calculations.33 ' According to the jury, "the total value of the busi-
ness was $2,394,964.00," but considering "the relocation and continuing
operation of the business," damages were $1,347,911.00.332 The trial court
awarded System Components the latter amount, and System Components
appealed.333 System Components relied on Department of Transportation v.
Tire Centers, L.L. C.,334 where the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
business damages provided in section 73.071(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes
are not subject to mitigation by an "'off-site cure.' 33 5 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal noted that while there might not be a "'duty to mitigate'
325. Id.
326. Sys. Components Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 985 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2008).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 688-89.
329. Id. at 689.
330. Id.
331. Sys. Components Corp., 985 So. 2d at 689.
332. Id.
333. See id.
334. 895 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
335. Sys. Components Corp., 985 So. 2d at 689 (citing Tire Ctrs., L.LC., 895 So. 2d at
1113).
2008]
29
Landau: 2007-2008 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
business damages" on the part of the condemnee, once relocation of the
business was accomplished and business continued, the benefit of doing so
must be offset against the total value of the business. 336 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court and certified such conflict with the
Fourth District Court of Appeal.337
In another case, the DOT obtained an order of taking, in July 2001, for
Parcel 104 in Indian River County alongside State Road 60 for the purpose
of widening the road.338 St. John's Water Control District filed a counter-
claim for inverse condemnation of Parcel 104A.339 After trial on May 30,
2006, on the counterclaim, the trial court awarded the Board of Supervisors
of St. John's Water Control District more than five million dollars for Parcel
104A, using the trial date for valuation and compensation under section
73.071(2) of the Florida Statutes.340 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded for a new trial and re-valuation. 34 "[Ijn an inverse
condemnation proceeding, .... the better rule"' is to use the date of appropria-
tion for purposes of valuing compensation.342
IX. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Workers' Compensation
Gayer was employed by Labor Finders of Broward, Inc. (Labor Find-
ers), a provider of temporary workers. 43 Labor Finders paid Gayer an hourly
wage, and Gayer received workers' compensation coverage through Labor
Finders.344 Fine Line Construction & Electric, Inc. (Fine Line) "leased"
Gayer from Labor Finders and put him to work.345 His job required the use
of "a tall folding ladder and an electric drill," and while performing the work,
Gayer fell off the ladder that had been furnished to him by Fine Line.' He
336. Id. at 692.
337. Id. at 693.
338. Dep't of Transp. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 981 So. 2d 605, 605 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
339. Id. at 606.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. (quoting County of Volusia v. Pickens, 439 So. 2d 276, 277 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983)).
343. Gayer v. Fine Line Constr. & Elec. Inc., 970 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
344. See id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
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was severely injured.347 Was the ladder defective in some way and its manu-
facturer liable?348 That was difficult to determine because the ladder "could
not be located."349 Gayer sued Fine Line claiming spoliation of evidence,
that is, the ladder. 350 Fine Line successfully 'moved for summary judgment,
arguing that it had no duty to preserve the ladder under section 440.39(7), [of
the] Florida Statutes, because [it] was not Gayer's 'employer.' ' 351  The
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. The claim for spoliation de-
pends on there being a "duty to preserve evidence. 353 The Fourth District
found this duty in section 440.39 of the Florida Statutes and quoted the
Third District Court of Appeal in General Cinema Beverages of Miami, Inc.
v. Mortimer,354 stating that "[t]he point of section 440.39 is to preserve caus-
es of action against third-party tortfeasors and to impose a duty of coopera-
tion to that end. 355 But was Gayer an employee of Fine Line and thus owed
a duty by Fine Line to preserve evidence?356 The Fourth District referred to
what it called "the majority rule under the doctrine of lent employment., 357
"[I1f the general employer simply arranges for labor without heavy equip-
ment, the transferred worker then becomes the employee of the special em-
ployer." 358 From there, the court had little difficulty concluding that Fine
Line was "a special employer of a borrowed employee"--Gayer-and fit
within the definition of "employer" used in section 440.39.
In Doe v. Footstar Corp., 6 the parents of a minor child, as her next
friends and guardians, brought an action against Footstar Corporation (Foots-
tar) for damages resulting from the alleged negligent hiring of their daugh-
ter's supervisor at Footstar, claiming the supervisor had assaulted their
daughter.36' The trial court ruled that the action against Footstar was barred
347. Id.
348. See Gayer, 970 So. 2d at 426 n.1.
349. Id. at 425.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 426.
352. Id.
353. Gayer, 970 So. 2d at 426 (quoting Flagstar Cos. v. Cole-Ehlinger, 909 So. 2d 320,
322-23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
354. 689 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
355. Gayer, 970 So. 2d at 427 (quoting Mortimer, 689 So. 2d at 279).
356. See id. at 426-28.
357. Id. at 428.
358. Id. at 427 (quoting Folds v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 875 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2004)).
359. Id. at 428-29.
360. 980 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
361. Id. at 1267. Some of the other allegations were negligent retention, assault, and bat-
tery. Id.
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by the workers' compensation exclusivity rule, section 440.11 of the Florida
Statutes.362 The Second District Court of Appeal acknowledged that the re-
sult seemed harsh, but that "[t]here is no exception to the exclusive remedy"
rule under section 440.11.363 Therefore, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed.36
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
State v. Young 365 is a Fourth Amendment search and seizure case involv-
ing a warrantless search by police of a computer furnished by an employer to
an employee at the employer's place of business-in this case, a church.366
Suffice it to say, that if the employer does not have a clearly articulated,
widely circulated, written policy allowing it to search computers it has pro-
vided its employees at work, then in the absence of valid consent or a valid
warrant, search of a computer by police will be subject to fact laden scrutiny
under the Fourth Amendment as to whether the employee had a legitimate
expectation of privacy.367 In Young, the police seized a clergyman's comput-
er at the church relying on permission to do so from another employee of the
church who was not the clergyman's supervisor. 68 The evidence obtained
from the computer and later related statements by the clergyman were sup-
pressed by the trial court.3 69 The State appealed, and the First District Court
of Appeal affirmed. 370 The church did not have a specific policy regarding
its access to employees' computers.37' In the absence of an explicit policy
concerning inspection of computers, can it be said that the employee had a
legitimate expectation of privacy concerning his computer?372 Under the
facts of this case-"focus[ing] on the operational realities of the
workplace"-the court concluded that this employee did.373 The employee's
office was not regularly shared with anyone else, the office could be
locked-there were three keys to the office door and the employee had two
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1267-68.
364. Footstar Corp., 980 So. 2d at 1268.
365. 974 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
366. Id. at 606, 608.
367. See id. at 609 (citing State v. Purifoy, 740 So. 2d 29, 30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1999)).
368. Id. at 606-07.
369. id. at 608.
370. Young, 974 So. 2d at 606.
371. Id. at 612.
372. See id. at 608-09.
373. Id. at 609.
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of the keys-when absent, the employee kept the door locked, and the em-
ployee's computer was not on a network with any other computer.374 The
employer's ownership of the computer did not matter because the employee
"was the sole regular user.' 375 However, an employee would not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy if a third party has or "reasonably appears to
have common authority over the" property-a computer-and the third party
gave consent to the search.376 That circumstance was not present here.377
The court noted that police may rely on a third party's apparent common
authority to give consent if the reliance is reasonable, even in the absence of
actual authority.378 The appellate court found that in this case, the facts did
not support a finding that the church employee giving permission to the po-
lice search had common authority, nor was it reasonable for the police to
think that he did.379 The clergyman's statements given to the police after the
recitation of the Miranda warning38 were also suppressed as being "fruit of
the poisonous tree."381
X. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND GOVERNANCE
The President of the Greenwich Association, Inc. (Association), "on be-
half of the unit owners," signed an agreement with Greenwich Apartments,
Inc. that settled a dispute over the use of a parking garage.382 In May 2001,
shortly after the agreement was signed, the circuit court entered a final order
dismissing the lawsuit, and the settlement was incorporated into the order.
383
There was no appeal. 38' The problem was that the settlement agreement was
never put to a vote of the Association's unit owners.385 The Association
brought suit against Greenwich Apartments, Inc. in April 2005.386 The Asso-
ciation asked the court to reform or cancel the settlement agreement alleging
374. Id. at 611.
375. Young, 974 So. 2d at 611.
376. Id. at 609 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)).
377. Id. at 612.
378. Id. at 610.
379. Id. at 612.
380. Young, 974 So. 2d at 607.
381. Id. at 610 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), and Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 387 (1920)).
382. Greenwich Ass'n v. Greenwich Apartments, Inc., 979 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
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an ultra vires act on the part of its then president that amounted to fraud.387
The trial court granted Greenwich Apartment Inc.'s motion for summary
judgment on the basis of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b).388 Ac-
cording to the trial court, this rule required the Association to bring its action
"within one year of the" court's earlier final order, that is, by May 2002,
which it did not do.389 Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) requires that
relief from a court's final judgment, decree, or order based on, inter alia,
intrinsic or extrinsic fraud, "'misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party"' must be brought within a year of the court's order.3 90 The
Third District Court of Appeal found the 2001 judgment to be voidable, but
not void, and therefore, the exception to the one year rule applicable to void
judgments did not apply.39' The rule, however, does not put a limit on the
relief from judgment a court may grant for fraud on the court.392 As to fraud
on the court, the Third District Court of Appeal determined that cognizable
"[f]raud upon the court" in this case had to be extrinsic fraud defined as
"where a party is prevented from 'trying an issue before the court and the
prevention itself becomes a collateral issue to the cause. ' 393 By contrast,
intrinsic fraud is "'the presentation of misleading information on an issue
before the court that was tried or could have been tried.' 394 The Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal found that the complaint of fraud on the court was in-
trinsic, if fraud at all, and was time barred by Florida Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 1.540(b).3 95
XI. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNET
Mr. O'Shea sued Cordis Corporation (Cordis) and Johnson & Johnson
alleging that he was injured as a result of a defective "stent implanted in
him., 396 As part of the discovery process, Mr. O'Shea made requests for
production of documents which Cordis claimed were confidential proprietary
387. Greenwich Ass'n, 979 So. 2d at 1118.
388. Id. at 1117;FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.540(b).
389. See id; see Greenwich Ass'n, 979 So.2d at 1117.
390. Id. at 1118 (quoting FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)).
391. Id. at 1118-19.
392. Id. at 1118; see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
393. Greenwich Ass'n, 979 So. 2d at 1118 (quoting Parker v. Parker, 950 So. 2d 388, 391
(Fla. 2007)).
394. Id. (quoting Parker, 950 So. 2d at 391).
395. Id. at 1119.
396. Cordis Corp. v. O'Shea, 988 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (Fla, 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per
curiam).
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trade secret items.397 Mr. O'Shea's attorney asked for an order that would
allow him to disclose to other lawyers confidential information gleaned dur-
ing discovery.398 The trial court issued such an order containing procedures
designed to maintain confidentiality. 399 The trial court also denied Cordis's
motion to prohibit Mr. O'Shea's attorney from sharing the confidential in-
formation with other attorneys, regardless of their involvement in collateral
litigation concerning the stent.'"° Cordis petitioned for certiorari review of
the trial court's order.4°' The petition was granted, and the trial court's order
was quashed. °2 By not limiting "sharing" confidential information to coun-
sel in collateral litigation over the stent, the trial court's order was too
broad. 3 Cordis demonstrated the order's potential of causing it irreparable
harm.4' Judge Farmer dissented.4 5
XII. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
A. Jurisdiction
Aspsoft, Inc. (Aspsoft) sued WebClay, Inc. (WebClay), and Mr. Allen
alleging "breach of an oral contract."4°6 Mr. Allen, a North Carolina resi-
dent, was the registered agent and president of WebClay. °7 WebClay's prin-
cipal place of business was also in North Carolina.4 8 Did Florida's long-arm
statute, section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes, justify the trial court's exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over both WebClay and Mr. Allen?4°9 Aspsoft
397. id. at 1164-65.
398. Id. at 1164,
399. Id. at 1165,
400. Id.
401. O'Shea, 988 So. 2d at 1164.
402. Id. at 1164, 1168.
403. Id. at 1168.
404. Id. at 1166.
405. Id. at 1168.
406. Aspsoft, Inc. v. WebClay, 983 So. 2d 761,763-64 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
407. Id. at 764.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 765. The Fifth District Court of Appeal's description of the contents of the
affidavits submitted by the parties does not include an indication that payments by WebClay
to Aspsoft were expressly required to be made in Florida. Id. at 764. The Fifth District Court
of Appeal concluded that:
[T]he facts set forth in Aspsoft's amended complaint and affidavits are sufficient to
support the conclusion that personal jurisdiction over WebClay by the Florida
courts is proper pursuant to Florida's long-arm statute since the affidavits state that
WebClay breached the parties' oral contract by failing to make payments which
were due to be made in Florida.
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alleged that WebClay, represented by Mr. Allen, hired Aspsoft to do soft-
ware consulting for WebClay and agreed to pay Aspsoft in response to in-
voices to be sent to WebClay by Aspsoft every two weeks. ° Aspsoft sub-
mitted affidavits stating that all work done by Aspsoft for WebClay occurred
in Florida.4" The trial court, relying on the recommendations of a General
Magistrate, dismissed the suit against WebClay and Mr. Allen with preju-
dice.412 The trial court found that the defendants did not have the minimum
amount of contacts with Florida for the court's exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over them.4 13 The trial court also found that Florida's statute of frauds,
section 725.01 of the Florida Statutes, barred the breach of contract claim. 414
The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal with
prejudice in favor of Mr. Allen.415 However, it reversed the trial court as to
WebClay.416 Citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais,4 17 the Fifth District
subjected the facts to a two-part jurisdictional analysis: "(1) whether the
facts set forth one or more of the predicate acts enumerated in section 48.193
of the Florida Statutes; and, if so, then (2) whether the facts set forth the
defendant's minimum contacts with Florida necessary to satisfy federal con-
stitutional due process requirements., 41 8 "[M]inimum contacts are estab-
lished if the court finds that 'the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum [sitate are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there."'419 The court observed that under sections 48.193(1)(a) and (g)
of the Florida Statutes, "[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on
a business or business venture in [the] state [and b]reaching a contract in this
state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in
this state," are sufficient acts to justify personal jurisdiction over an entity,
therefore, paying Aspsoft's invoices conferred jurisdiction on Florida courts
over Webclay. 420 The Fifth District Court of Appeal had no problem con-
cluding WebClay had these minimum contacts with Florida and could "rea-
Aspsoft, Inc., 983 So. 2d at 766. However, in its amended complaint, Aspsoft alleged that
some payments were made to it in Florida. Id. at 763-64.
410. Id. at 764.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. See Aspsoft, Inc., 983 So. 2d at 764.
414. Id. at 768-69.
415. Id. at 769.
416. Id.
417. 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989).
418. Aspsoft, Inc., 983 So. 2d at 765.
419. Id. (citing Glovegold Shipping, Ltd. v. Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening, 791
So. 2d 4, 11 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
420. Id. at 766.
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sonably anticipate being haled into court there".42' As to the statute of frauds
ground for dismissing Aspsoft's lawsuit, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
held that only if the oral contract could not possibly be performed within the
statute's threshold of one year could the statute of frauds be said to apply.
422
Aspsoft's complaint against WebClay was reinstated.423
In Renaissance Health Publishing, L.L.C. v. Resveratrol Partners,
L.L. C,424 Renaissance Health Publishing, L.L.C. (Renaissance), a Florida
corporation, brought a trade libel action in Florida against Resveratrol Part-
ners, L.L.C. (Resveratrol), "a Nevada limited liability company., 425 Renais-
sance asserted that the court had jurisdiction over Resveratrol under Florida's
long-arm statute, section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes. 426 "The trial court
granted [Resveratrol's] motion to dismiss" for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion.427 Renaissance appealed.428 Resveratrol did not maintain an office,
employ agents, own any real estate, have any bank accounts in Florida, or
solicit customers by direct mail or advertise in "magazine[s] or periodical[s]
delivered to Florida" or by means of "Florida based broadcast or cable adver-
tising., 429 Resveratrol sold its competing product, Longevinex, on its inter-
active website.43° "In the three-year period prior to" the lawsuit, Resveratrol
made sales "to Florida residents through [its] website" which sales
"represented 2.4% of [its] total gross domestic sales."'43' During the same
period, eighty-six of its books and e-books were sold to Florida residents for
a total of $2101.83.432 The Fourth District Court of Appeal not only found
that the requirements of section 48.193 were satisfied, it also found sufficient
minimum contacts to satisfy the due process requirements under Venetian
Salami Co. 433 What tipped the scales in this case is that Resveratrol's web-
site was an interactive website as opposed to a passive website.434
421. Id. at 766-67 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297).
422. Id. at 769.
423. See Aspsoft, Inc., 983 So. 2d at 769.
424. 982 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
425. Id. at 740.
426. See id. at 740-41.
427. Id. at 741.
428. Id.
429. Renaissance, 982 So. 2d. at 741.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 741-42 (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989)).
434. Renaissance, 982 So. 2d at 742 (citing Westwind Limousine, Inc. v. Shorter, 932 So.
2d 571, 575 n.7 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
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B. Venue
The genesis of the appeal in McWane, Inc. v. Water Management Ser-
vices, Inc.435 was a lawsuit against several defendants from several states for
breach of contract and breach of warranty based on damages alleged to have
resulted "from the structural failure of' a pipeline that carried water to St.
George Island, in Florida's panhandle.436 It appears that the plaintiff, Water
Management Services, Inc., a Florida corporation, objected to "the enforce-
ment of a . . .contractual forum selection provision" to jurisdictions other
than Florida.4 37 The trial court agreed that the contractual forum selections
should not be enforced. 438 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed.43 9 A
contractual forum selection provision will not be enforced if it can be shown
that by enforcing the provision, the party's "trial in the agreed-upon forum
'will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court."' 4  Some inconvenience and extra
expense is not enough to overcome a contractual provision." 1 In the case
presented, the "legally and factually interrelated claims and cross-claims
alleging structural damage to a single line of pipe by multiple defendants
from multiple states" supported the trial court's decision." 2
XII. LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP
A. Assignment of Lease
In Leesburg Community Cancer Center v. Leesburg Regional Medical
Center, Inc.,"4 Leesburg Regional Medical Center (Regional), as lessor, in
1985, made "a thirty-year ground lease with Leesburg Real Estate Asso-
ciates, Inc." (Associates), as lessee. 4 The purpose of the lease was to allow
"Associates to develop and operate [a] ...cancer treatment center on the
property." 445 The lease forbade Regional from operating "a competing can-
435. 967 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
436. Id. at 1007.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 1007-08.
440. McWane, Inc., 967 So. 2d at 1007 (quoting Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 440
n.4 (Fla. 1986)).
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. 972 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
444. Id. at 205.
445. Id.
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cer treatment center ... within ... Regional's 'primary service area' during
the" lease term.446 Associates had the right to assign or sublet "all or part of
its leasehold."" 7 All assignments and subleases were to be made "subject to
the terms" of the original ground lease, and the ground lease's terms had to
be incorporated by Associates "into any assignment or sublease" made by
it.448 Associates promptly sublet the property to Leesburg Community Can-
cer Center (Cancer Center), "a limited partnership formed by" Associates'
shareholders.449
In 2000, Regional bought Associates' leasehold interest for $1,900,000,
with the intention of allowing Regional to participate in a nearby competing
cancer treatment facility.450 Regional's position was "that the exclusivity
clause" in the lease was personal between it and Associates.451' Regional
argued that its purchase of Associates' leasehold interest extinguished the
exclusivity clause. 52 Cancer Center, as sublessee, sought declaratory relief
on the issue of the extinguishment of the exclusivity clause. 3 The trial court
granted summary judgment to Regional and Cancer Center appealed.454 The
Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed.455
The general rule is that privity of contract does not exist between a les-
sor and sublessee.456 Without privity between Regional and Cancer Center,
Cancer Center had no right to enforce any of the lease covenants.457 Had this
been an assignment of the leasehold interest from Associates to Cancer Cen-
ter, then Cancer Center would be standing "in the shoes of the assignor. 4 58
The Fifth District Court of Appeal found that it was clear that a sublease, not
an assignment, was intended, and the parties behaved in this fashion. 459 "If
the parties had intended to create a non-compete covenant between Leesburg
Regional and any sublessee of Real Estate Associates, they could have easily
said so in the ground lease.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Leesburg Cmty., 972 So. 2d at 205.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Leesburg Cmty., 972 So. 2d at 205.
454. Id. at 204.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 206.
457. See id.
458. Leesburg Cmty., 972 So. 2d at 206 (quoting Lauren Kyle Holdings, Inc. v. Heath-
Peterson Constr. Corp., 864 So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
459. Id.
460. Id. at 207.
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B. Personal Guarantee of Lease
In Fairway Mortgage Solutions, Inc. v. Locust Gardens,461 Fairway
Mortgage Solutions (tenant) "entered into a five-year" lease with Locust
Gardens (landlord).4 62 The lease was signed "on behalf of the tenant" by
Fernando Recalde, its president."63 "[D]irectly below the signature line" was
the following, which was hand-printed: "FERNANDO RECALDE,
PRESIDENT. ' '464  Below that line, was the following: "* NOTE-
PERSONAL GUARANTY THE TENANT SIGN[A]TURE ABOVE ALSO
INDICATES ACCEPTANCE OF PERSONALLY GUARANTEEING THIS
LEASE AND IS BEING FREELY GIVEN AS PER SECTION 'G' OF
THIS LEASE."465
The lease agreement provided that the tenant and guarantor would be
"jointly and severally liable. '466 "In March 2006, the tenant contacted a real
estate [agent], who had [been] the landlord's leasing agent" and informed the
agent that the tenant was relocating and needed "assistance in finding a sub-
tenant., 467 The tenant failed to make the April 2006 and later rent pay-
ments.468 The landlord sued for possession, "damages, and breach of guaran-
ty. ' '469 The tenant argued that the landlord "failed to mitigate damages," and
Mr. Recalde claimed that the guaranty language had been added to the lease
agreement after the lease was signed "without his knowledge or consent.
' 470
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the landlord on the
issue of mitigation of damages and Mr. Recalde's guaranty.47' The tenant
and Mr. Recalde appealed, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal left un-
disturbed the summary judgment in favor of the landlord concerning mitiga-
tion of damages.472
The landlord's duty to mitigate damages by trying to re-let the property
did not begin until it had retaken possession.473 That occurred in August
461. 988 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
462. Id. at 679.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 679-80.
466. Locust Gardens, 988 So. 2d at 680.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. ld.
471. Locust Gardens, 988 So. 2d at 680. The parties stipulated that the landlord was en-
titled to possession. Id.
472. ld. at 681.
473. Id.
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2006, and by November 2006, the landlord had obtained a replacement te-
nant for part of the square footage leased.474 The landlord had, in fact, miti-
gated damages.4 75 However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the
summary judgment with respect to the guaranty finding that there were still
genuine issues of material fact regarding the validity of the guaranty.476 A
signature on a document that follows the word "by," plus descriptive words
identifying the signor "'as a corporate officer or ... similar [position], does
not create personal liability for the' signor unless the contract has language
to the contrary.477
C. Payment into Court Registry
In Blandin v. Bay Porte Condominium Ass'n.,478 Mr. Blandin owned
land on which "a ten-unit condominium building" is located.479 In 1971, Mr.
Blandin, as lessor, made "a 99-year land lease with the building's develop-
er," as lessee.480 As the developer sold the units, it assigned a percentage
interest in the ground lease to the buyers-unit owners-as lessees.4 8 The
land lease had "a rent escalation clause ... based [on] the consumer price
index. 482 In 2006, "[Mr.] Blandin notified the association and unit owners"
of the amount of the increased rent.483 "[T]he unit owners failed to pay...
,484 Mr. Blandin then sent a three-day notice, but there still was no pay-
ment.485 He then filed an action "for breach of the land lease, [asking for]
possession and damages. 486 The unit owners asked the court to "determine
the amount of the accrued rent [they must] place[] in the court registry [un-
der] section 83.232" of the Florida Statutes.487
474. Id.
475. Locust Gardens, 988 So. 2d at 681.
476. Id.
477. Id. (citing Robert C. Malt & Co. v. Carpet World Distribs., Inc., 763 So. 2d 508, 510
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (where the scope of the guaranty was not spelled out in the
agreement)).
478. 988 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
479. Id. at 667.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Blandin, 988 So. 2d at 667.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Id.
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"On August 22, 2007, the trial court ordered the unit owners" to pay
rent at the old rate until the new amount could be determined.488 On Novem-
ber 2, 2007, Mr. Blandin moved "for immediate final default judgment of
possession," alleging that the unit owners did not make the October or No-
vember payments.4"9 The association's new management company took the
blame for missing the payments. 490 "[T]he trial court denied Mr. Blandin's
motion" and ordered him instead to accept the late rent payments which had
been offered, as good cause had been shown for the delay.49' Mr. Blandin
appealed the denial of his motion.492 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded the matter "for the issuance of immediate writs of
possession."4 93 Subsections (1) and (5) of section 83.232 of the Florida Sta-
tutes, when read together, allow the trial court to extend the tenant's time to
make rent payments only if the court exercises its discretion before the pay-
ment due date, not after.494 If "a tenant fails to timely pay pursuant to a court
order, the court" loses the discretion to extend the due date and must "enter
an immediate default for possession, without further notice or hearing." '495
XIV. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
In Braswell v. Ryan Investments, Ltd. ,496 Mrs. Braswell had obtained
judgments against her husband, now deceased, resulting from "his failure to
make payments" to her under a marital settlement agreement entered into in
2000.' 9' The marital home-which Mrs. Braswell no longer occupied-
"had been titled in the name of Ryan Investments, Ltd.," (Corporation) since
its purchase in 1997.498 Relying on what is called "'outsider reverse corpo-
rate piercing' theory, ' 49 Mrs. Braswell tried to execute her judgments by
levy on the home alleging that the Corporation was her husband's "alter ego
and that he" titled the property in the corporate name to defraud her.' ° The
488. Blandin, 988 So. 2d at 667.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 668.
492. Id.
493. Blandin, 988 So. 2d at 670.
494. Id. at 669.
495. Id.
496. 989 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
497. Id. at 38.
498. Id.
499. Id. (citing Estudios, Proyectos e Inversiones de Centro America, S.A. v. Swiss Bank
Corp., S.A., 507 So. 2d 1119, 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 518 So. 2d
1274 (Fla. 1987)).
500. Id.
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trial court rebuffed her attempt to execute on the home.50 The Third District
Court of Appeal affirmed.5 °2 The Third District acknowledged that the cor-
porate veil can be pierced when the "'controlling shareholder form[s] or
use[s] the corporation to defraud creditors"' for pre-existing obligations.5 3
The corporation itself can also be held liable to satisfy the debts of the con-
trolling shareholders when they "'have formed or used the corporation to
secrete assets"' thus avoiding "'preexisting personal liability.,' 50 4  These
remedies were not available to Mrs. Braswell. 50 5 The marital home had been
held in the Corporation's name for three years prior to the marital settlement
agreement.5l
The obligations of Mr. Braswell to Mrs. Braswell came into being after
the home had been titled in the corporate name, not before.50 7 It was no se-
cret to Mrs. Braswell that the home was titled in the name of the corpora-
508tion.
XV. TORTS
A. Negligence
Mr. Tringali was a member of L.A. Fitness International (L.A. Fitness),
a health club.5° Mr. Tringali fell from the stepping machine he was using at
an L.A. Fitness facility, and he died of heart failure.51° Mr. Tringali's
"daughter, as personal representative of' her father's estate, sued L.A. Fit-
ness for wrongful death, alleging that the health club had a "duty to render
aid during a medical emergency" and: 1) failed to medically screen her fa-
ther; 2) failed to use cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR); "3) failed to have
an automatic external defibrillator (AED) on its premises and to use it on
[her father]; and 4) failed to properly train its employees" to deal with medi-
cal emergencies.5 1' A judgment was entered against L.A. Fitness, awarding
501. Braswell, 989 So. 2d at 39.
502. Id. at 41.
503. Id. at 38 (quoting Estudios, 507 So. 2d at 1120).
504. Id. at 39 (quoting Estudios, 507 So. 2d at 1120).
505. Id.
506. Braswell, 989 So. 2d at 39.
507. Id. at 38.
508. Id. at 38-39.
509. L.A. Fitness Int'l, L.L.C. v. Mayer, 980 So. 2d 550, 556 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
510. Id. at 552.
511. Id.
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damages of $619,650, and L.A. Fitness appealed. At trial, there was testi-
mony to the effect that Mr. Strayer, an employee of L.A. Fitness, was certi-
fied in CPR.513 Immediately upon learning that a patron was in distress, Mr.
Strayer "told the receptionist to call 911," which she did.514 Testimony of the
employees and witnesses differed as to how much time elapsed between the
time of the 911 call and the arrival of the paramedics, as well as to the
amount of time that elapsed between the time Mr. Tringali collapsed and the
emergency medical technicians arrived. 515  The estimates were generally
about four minutes after the 911 call, but perhaps up to twelve minutes after
Mr. Tringali collapsed.516 Mr. Strayer examined Mr. Tringali in the mean-
time and decided against CPR as he thought it might "make matters
worse." '517 The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that it appeared that
the duty of an owner of a health club to an injured customer was a matter of
first impression in Florida.5t 8 Referring to its decision in Estate of Starling v.
Fisherman's Pier, Inc.,519 the Fourth District Court of Appeal approved the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 314A, "that a proprietor is under an
ordinary duty of care to render aid to an invitee after he knows or has reason
to know the invitee is ill or injured., 520 Citing decisions from other states,
the Fourth District concluded that L.A. Fitness fulfilled its duty to Mr. Trin-
gali by calling for paramedics "within a reasonable time. '52' The court re-
versed the trial court's judgment and remanded.522 Along the way, the
Fourth District also pointed out that the Florida Legislature had failed to
strengthen Florida's Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13 of the Florida Sta-
tutes.523 The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that statutory protection
for persons like Mr. Strayer was illusory. 524 Had Mr. Strayer performed CPR
on Mr. Tringali, he could have been subjected to liability for failure to per-
512. Id. at 556.
513. Id. at552.
514. Mayer, 980 So. 2d at 552.
515. Id. at552-53.
516. Id.
517. Id. at552.
518. Id. at 557.
519. 401 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
520. Mayer, 980 So. 2d at 557 (citing Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge, 271
S.E.2d 335, 338 (W. Va. 1980)).
521. Id.at561-62.
522. Id. at 562.
523. Id. at 561 n.2.
524. Id.
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form it properly.525 Mr. Strayer's assessment of Mr. Tringali's condition and
decision to forego CPR did not expose him to liability.526
B. Negligent Hiring
Mr. Stander's death resulted from an automobile accident with Mr.
Braswell.527 Mr. Braswell, an independent contractor, had been hired by
Dispoz-O-Products, Inc. to transport paper goods to Florida.52 8 The personal
representative of Mr. Stander's estate sued Dispoz-O-Products for damag-
es. 529 The personal representative contended that Dispoz-O-Products should
be held liable for Mr. Braswell's alleged negligence on several grounds, in
particular, because Dispoz-O-Products was negligent in hiring Mr. Bras-
well.530 It was further "alleged that Dispoz-O-Products was negligent be-
cause it knew or should have known that "the independent contractor it hired
was inexperienced, dangerous, negligent, and unfit for the job.53" ' The trial
court dismissed the personal representative's complaint with prejudice, rul-
ing that the complaint was only conclusory and alleged no facts in support of
a cause of action for negligent hiring.532 The personal representative ap-
pealed.533 The Fourth District Court of Appeal stated the pertinent general
rule as "the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the negli-
gence of the independent contractor because the employer has no control
over the manner in which the work is done. 534 The Fourth District acknowl-
edged that its decision in Suarez v. Gonzalez535 is "an exception to the gener-
al rule. ' 536 In Suarez, a landlord hired a man to install cabinets in her garage
that she was getting into condition to rent.537 The work was paid for in cash,
there was no written contract, and the landlord had no knowledge as to
whether or not the cabinet installer was licensed.5 38 The landlord did not
525. See Mayer, 980 So. 2d at 561 n.2.
526. See id. at 563 (Stevenson, J., concurring).
527. Stander v. Dispoz-O-Prods., Inc., 973 So. 2d 603, 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(Emas, J., dissenting).
528. Id.
529. See id.
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Stander, 973 So. 2d at 605.
533. Id. at 604.
534. Id. (quoting Suarez v. Gonzales, 820 So. 2d 342, 344 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
535. 820 So. 2d at 342.
536. Stander, 973 So. 2d at 604.
537. Id. at 605.
538. Id.
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even know the installer's name.539 Later, "one of the cabinets fell, [and t]he
tenant was seriously injured." 5" Because of the duty owed by a landlord to a
tenant, the exception to the general rule applied in Suarez, so the landlord
could be held liable.-41 Here, on the other hand, Mr. Stander's personal rep-
resentative alleged no facts that took this case out of the general rule.42 Ab-
sent such facts, Dispoz-O-Products owed no duty to third parties such as Mr.
Stander.543 Judge Emas dissented.5" Judge Emas would have held, "as a
matter of law, [that] a cause of action exists [in Florida] for negligent selec-
tion of an independent contractor [with respect to the shipment of] non-
hazardous goods on the highway." 5
C. Punitive Damages
Mr. Hipple, an invitee of Tiger Point Golf and Country Club (Tiger
Point), with the help of "two others, forcibly removed a handrail on Tiger
Point's" property. 546 During the process, the handrail fell on Mr. Hippie's
foot, and a bone in his toe was broken. 47 Mr. Hipple sued Tiger Point for
negligence.5 48 An affidavit filed in the action stated that "the handrail 'was
very badly rusted and in terrible shape."' 54 9 There was also evidence to the
effect that Tiger Point had notice of the handrail's state of disrepair for al-
most two weeks before Mr. Hippie was injured.550 Tiger Point unsuccessful-
ly moved for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages, and the
jury then awarded Mr. Hippie comparative negligence compensatory damag-
es of slightly less than $6500 plus $85,000 in punitive damages.5 1 Tiger
Point appealed, and the First District Court of Appeal held that the trial court
should have granted "summary judgment [to Tiger Point] on the issue of
punitive damages. ''552 Mr. Hippie failed to make a reasonable showing of
entitlement to punitive damages under section 768.72(1) of the Florida Sta-
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Stander, 973 So. 2d at 604.
542. Id. at 605.
543. See id.
544. Id. at 606 (Emas, J. dissenting).
545. Id.
546. Tiger Point Golf & Country Club v. Hipple, 977 So. 2d 608, 609 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2007).
547. Id.
548. See id.
549. Id. at 610.
550. Id.
551. Hipple, 977 So. 2d at 609.
552. Id. at 611.
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tutes.553 He failed to demonstrate that Tiger Point's conduct was "'outra-
geous, because of. . . evil motive or ... reckless indifference to the rights of
others. ' '' 554 According to the First District Court of Appeal, punitive damag-
es require evidence of "willful and wanton misconduct of a character no less
culpable than what is necessary to convict of criminal manslaughter.
555
Neglecting, even for a considerable period of time, to repair a clearly defec-
tive handrail which results in an injury is conduct not culpable enough to
warrant punitive damages.556
D. Liability Disclaimer
The Loewes contracted with Seagate Homes, Inc. (Seagate) to build a
home for them. 57 There was an exculpatory provision in the contract that
provided, among other things, that Seagate was released from any liability to
the Loewes for personal injury resulting from Seagate's "negligence, gross
negligence, strict liability or the intentional conduct of [Seagate], its officers,
directors, owners, employees, their successors, legal representatives, and
assigns. ''558 The Loewes sued Seagate, alleging that shortly after they closed
on the purchase and moved into the home, "a bathroom closet door fell off its
track and [hit] Mrs. Loewe in the eye, causing serious . . . permanent in-
jur[y]." 5 9 Their negligence action included a claim for damages based on
Mrs. Loewe's injuries, and a count for loss of consortium.56 Relying on the
exculpatory clause, the trial court dismissed the Loewe's complaint with
prejudice. 56' The Loewes appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal
found several reasons to reverse.562 First, the exculpatory clause could not
absolve Seagate of liability based on intentional torts. 563 Second, and assum-
ing a building code violation may be an issue, a party cannot contract
away-in a contract with a person whom the building codes are designed to
553. See id. at 610 n.2 (referencing FLA. STAT. § 768.72(1) (2006).
554. Id. at 610 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 908(2) (1979)).
555. Id. at 610.
556. Hipple, 977 So. 2d at 610.
557. Loewe v. Seagate Homes, Inc., 987 So. 2d 758, 759 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
558. Id. at 759-60.
559. Id. at 759.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Loewe, 987 So. 2d at 759.
563. Id. at 760 (citing Kellums v. Freight Sales Ctrs., Inc., 467 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
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protect-its responsibilities under building codes.564 Finally, the exculpatory
clause could not prevent the Loewes from bringing a claim for negligence
because of public policy protecting purchasers and the public from personal
injury resulting from improper construction by a building contractor, citing
sections 489.101 and 553.781 (1) of the Florida Statutes.65
E. Tortious Interference with Business Relationship
Weitnauer Duty Free, Inc. (Weitnauer) had a duty-free store in Port
Everglades, and Imperial Majesty Cruise Line, L.L.C. (Cruise Line), which
sailed from Port Everglades, had a duty-free store on the ship. 66 Cruise Line
"barricaded and prevented" shopping by its passengers at Weitnauer's store
while in port.567 Weitnauer sued Cruise Line for "tortious interference with a
contract or business relation[ship]. '5 68 After a bench trial, the judge entered
judgment in favor of Weitnauer, awarding it $1000 in nominal damages even
though the court had found that Weitnauer failed to present sufficient evi-
dence to prove actual damages.169 The judge also awarded $750,000 of puni-
tive damages.57' The trial court judge found Cruise Line's actions to be
"'calculated, predatory, and excessive. Cruise Line appealed, and the
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. 72 The Fourth Dis-
trict disagreed with the punitive damage award.5 73 The court relied on its
decision in Hospital Corp. of Lake Worth v. Romaguera 74 where it said that
when the issue is an award of punitive damages in the context of "tortious
interference with a business relationship, . . . 'the two most important criteria
are: 1. Whether the interference was justified, 2. The nature, extent and
enormity of the wrong.' 575 The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that
Cruise Line's conduct was not outrageous or egregious enough to support
punitive damages.576 The court also reversed the award of nominal damag-
564. Id. (citing John's Pass Seafood Co. v. Weber, 369 So. 2d 616, 618 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979)).
565. Id. at 760-61.
566. Imperial Majesty Cruise Line, L.L.C. v. Weitnauer Duty Free, Inc., 987 So. 2d 706,
707 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
567. Id. at 708.
568. Id. at 707.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. Imperial Majesty, 987 So. 2d at 708.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. 511 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
575. Imperial Majesty, 987 So. 2d at 708 (quoting Romaguera, 511 So. 2d at 561).
576. Id.
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es.577 "[P]roof of actual damages is an element of a cause of action for tor-
tious interference" and Weitnauer did not prove actual damages.578
F. False Light Invasion of Privacy
In Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. (Rapp 1),579 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal asked the Supreme Court of Florida if Florida recognizes the tort of
false light invasion of privacy, and in Gannett Co., Inc. v. Anderson,58° the
First District Court of Appeal asked the Supreme Court of Florida what sta-
tute of limitations applies to the tort of false light invasion of privacy.581 In
Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp (Rapp 11),582 the Supreme Court of Florida ans-
wered the first question in the negative thus mooting the question raised in
Anderson v. Gannett Co., Inc. 583 The Supreme Court of Florida, in Rapp II,
found that the tort of false light invasion of privacy was virtually indistin-
guishable from a cause of action for defamation by implication---"false sug-
gestions, impressions and implications arising from otherwise truthful state-
ments."5 4 The Court, citing Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television Corp.585 and
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. 944 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006). See Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra
note 1, at 110-11.
580. 947 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006). See Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra
note 1, at 108-10.
581. The question certified by the Fourth District Court of Appeal: "[d]oes Florida recog-
nize the tort of false light invasion of privacy, and if so, are the elements of the tort set forth in
section 652E of Restatement (Second) of Torts?" Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 468. The question
certified by the First District Court of Appeal: "[i]s an action for invasion of privacy based on
the false light theory governed by the two-year statute of limitations that applies to defamation
claims or by the four-year statute that applies to unspecified tort claims?" Gannett Co., Inc.,
947 So. 2d at 11.
582. 33 Fla. L. Weekly S849, S849 (Oct. 23, 2008).
583. Anderson v. Gannett Co., Inc., 33 Fla. L. Weekly S856, S856 (Oct. 23, 2008). In
Straub v. Lehtinen, Vargas & Riedi, P.A., the plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of
"his second amended complaint for false light invasion of privacy." 980 So. 2d 1085, 1086
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007). The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the plaintiffs
allegations set forth the necessary elements to support a false light invasion of privacy claim
under Florida law, relying on Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. (Rapp 1) and Gannett Co., Inc. v.
Anderson, but noted that it "previously questioned the vitality of a claim for false light inva-
sion of privacy" and joined in certifying the question previously certified by it in Rapp. Id. at
1086-87. The Supreme Court of Florida stayed Straub v. Lehtinen, Vargas & Riedi, P.A.,
pending the Court's decision in Rapp II. Rapp II, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at S855-56 n.14.
584. Rapp 11, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at S851 (quoting Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.,
649 N.E.2d 825, 829-30 (N.Y. 1995).
585. 431 So.2d 627 (Fla. 5thDist. Ct. App. 1983).
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Brown v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc.,8s confirmed that Florida recognizes
the tort of defamation by implication.5 7 Defamation by implication, being "a
well-recognized species of defamation," comes with a substantial body of
law and First Amendment protections. 8 The tort of false light invasion of
privacy is lacking in this regard. 589
Of particular interest in Rapp II is the Court's adoption of comment e to
section 559 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as "stating the appropriate
'community' standard for analyzing a defamation claim. ',590 Specifically, "a
communication is defamatory if it prejudiced the plaintiff in the eyes of a
'substantial and respectable minority of the community. '"'59  The Court's
adoption of the Restatement's "community" standard prompted an opinion
from Justice Wells, dissenting in part, who found it "plainly too vague.
' 592
XVI. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR RIGHTS
A. Garnishment
DOES AN ATTORNEY GARNISHEE HAVE A DUTY TO
ISSUE A STOP PAYMENT ORDER FOR A CHECK DRAWN
ON HIS OR HER TRUST ACCOUNT AND DELIVERED TO
THE PAYEE PRIOR TO THE RECEIPT OF A WRIT OF
GARNISHMENT IF THE SERVICE OF THAT WRIT OCCURS
PRIOR TO THE PRESENTMENT OF THAT CHECK FOR
PAYMENT TO THE ATTORNEY'S BANK?
593
That was the question certified to the Supreme Court of Florida by the
Second District Court of Appeal as being "of great public importance" in
Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, P.A. v. First American Holdings, Inc.594 As a
matter of first impression, the Court answered in the affirmative.595 Arnold,
Matheny and Eagan, P.A. (the law firm) represented Preclude, Inc. (Prec-
lude) in an action against Greenleaf Products, Inc. (Greenleaf). 6 A $50,000
586. 440 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
587. Rapp 11, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at S852.
588. Id.
589. Id. at S849.
590. Id. at S855.
591. Rapp 11, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at S850.
592. Id. at S855.
593. Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, P.A. v. First Am. Holdings, Inc., 982 So. 2d 628, 630
(Fla. 2008).
594. Id.
595. Id.at630-31.
596. Id. at 631.
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settlement was obtained by the law firm on behalf of Preclude.597 Sometime
before that settlement, a $26,000 judgment against Preclude had been ob-
tained by First American Holding, Inc. (First American) in an action unre-
lated to the matter between Preclude and Greenleaf.5 98 First American served
the law firm with a writ of garnishment on June 19, 2002.59 When served
with the writ, the law firm had not yet received the $50,000 settlement check
from Greenleaf.6° The law firm responded to the writ by stating that it held
no funds of Preclude.6°1 On June 21, 2002, the Greenleaf settlement check
was received and deposited to the law firm's trust account, and the law firm
issued a net settlement check to Preclude.6°z "[O]n June 25, 2002, First
American served a second writ of garnishment on [the law firm] . . .60'
The law firm again responded to the effect that it did not have "possession or
control of any funds" belonging to Preclude.6 4 However, the check the law
firm had written from its trust account to Preclude on June 21 "was not pre-
sented to [the law firm's] bank for payment until June 28. "605 Focusing on
the requirement of section 77.06(2) of the Florida Statutes that the garnishee
be in "possession or control" of the judgment debtor's property, the Court
held that the law firm retained control of the funds represented by the check
until the check was presented for payment, and therefore, the law firm had a
duty to request a stop payment order to the bank.6' The law firm should
have inquired of its bank on June 25, 2008, "as to whether its check had been
presented for payment." 7 Next, the Court found "no reason" to distinguish
between "bank and non-bank garnishees." 8 The fact that an attorney trust
account was involved made no difference. 6 9 In response to the argument
that the law finn was exposed to liability to its client for issuing a stop pay-
ment order or to a third party holder in due course to whom the check might
have been negotiated, the Court said the "good faith" exception to a garni-
shee's liability in section 77.06(3) of the Florida Statutes would have to be
597. Id.
598. Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, P.A., 982 So. 2d at 631.
599. Id.
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. Id.
603. Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, P.A., 982 So. 2d at 631.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id. at 632-35 (citing FLA. STAT. § 77.06(2) (2002)).
607. Id. at 641.
608. Arnold, Matheny, & Eagan, P.A., 982 So. 2d at 637.
609. Id. at 640.
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protection enough.610 The law firm was liable to the garnishor, First Ameri-
can Holdings, Inc.61
B. Homestead
The Supreme Court of Florida in Chames v. DeMayo,1 2 asked: "Should
this Court recede from longstanding precedent holding that the Florida Con-
stitution's exemption from forced sale of a homestead cannot be waived?
613
The Court answered with a resounding "'no. ' ' 614 The case was based on a
retainer agreement Mr. DeMayo made with the law firm of Heller &
Chames, P.A.615 The agreement read in part that "the client hereby knowing-
ly, voluntarily and intelligently waives his rights to assert his homestead
exemption in the event a charging lien is obtained to secure the balance of
attorney's fees and costs. ' 6 16 The day came when the law firm "obtained a
charging lien and final judgment against DeMayo .. .[and the] trial court
applied the lien to DeMayo's home., 617 The Third District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court on the waiver of homestead issue, and the Supreme
Court of Florida upheld the District Court's decision.6t 8 Article X, section 4,
subsection (a)(1) of the Florida Constitution sets out the Florida homestead
exemption from forced sale.619 There are well-known exceptions to the ex-
emption for: 1) real estate taxes and assessments; 2) mortgages; and 3) me-
chanics and materialmen's liens.6 20 The Court in Chames, which cited to
Carter's Administrators v. Carter and Sherbill v. Miller Manufacturing Co.,
noted that it has held for over a hundred years that the exemption from
forced sale of the homestead "cannot be waived in an unsecured agree-
ment., 62' The Court found no reason why this precedent should not be fol-
lowed.622 Acknowledging that personal constitutional rights can be waived,
the Court held that the homestead exemption was more than personal to the
610. Id. at 641 (citing FLA. STAT. § 77.06(3)).
611. Id.
612. 972 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2007).
613. Id. at 853.
614. Id.
615. Id. at 852.
616. Id.
617. Chames, 972 So. 2d at 852.
618. Id. at 852-53.
619. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1); Chames, 972 So. 2d at 852.
620. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
621. Chames, 972 So. 2d at 852 (citing Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558 (1884);
Sherbill v. Miller Mfg. Co., 89 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1956)).
622. Chames, 972 So. 2d at 860.
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homestead owner.623 The homestead exemption also protects the owner's
family and the State of Florida.624
C. Construction Lien
Mary Niehaus (Niehaus) contacted Big Ben's Tree Service, Inc. (Big
Ben's) and arrangements were made for Big Ben's to cut down and remove a
damaged tree located on Niehaus's property.625 The cost was set at $4800.626
Although not stated explicitly, Big Ben's apparently did not take the remains
of the tree off the property after cutting it down, and Niehaus did not pay Big
Ben's. 627 It seems that Niehaus thought that "remove" meant hauling away
the tree after it had been cut down.628 Big Ben's thought that "remove"
meant simply moving the tree which, according to Big Ben's, is what "re-
move" means in the tree trade.629 The trial court found that this trade "par-
lance" was not explained to Niehaus and also found that her understanding of
the word "remove" was reasonable. 630 The trial court, however, concluded
that Big Ben's had a valid construction lien on Niehaus' land. 63' Niehaus
appealed to the circuit court, and the circuit court affirmed.632 She then filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the First District Court of Appeal
granted, quashing the order of the circuit court.633 The trial court determined
that "removal" meant something different to each of the parties, and there-
fore, agreement on a material term of the contract was missing.6 4 Thus,
there was no contract entered into between the parties.635 And without a va-
lid express contract, there could be no imposition of a construction lien.636
Even if an implied contract existed, an issue which the First District Court of
623. Id.
624. Id.
625. Niehaus v. Big Ben's Tree Serv., Inc., 982 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
626. Id.
627. See id.
628. Id.
629. Id.
630. Niehaus, 982 So. 2d at 1254.
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. Id. at 1254-55.
634. Id.
635. Niehaus, 982 So. 2d at 1255.
636. Id.
20081
53
Landau: 2007-2008 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Appeal did not decide,637 implied contract is a "legal fiction" to prevent
unjust enrichment, and "not a contract at all. 638
D. Bank Deposit Agreement v. UCC
The Deposit Agreement between Bank of America, N.A. (Bank) and its
customer, Putnal Seed and Grain, Inc. (Putnal), required Putnal to notify the
Bank of any "'problems or unauthorized transactions"' taking place during a
bank account statement period within sixty days, as a condition to asserting
liability against the Bank for negligence.639 Under section 674.406(6) of the
Florida Statutes, described by the trial court as the default rule, a bank cus-
tomer has to notify the bank of "an unauthorized signature or alteration with-
in one year of the [pertinent bank] statement being sent to the customer. ' 64°
Putnal's bookkeeper made deposits for Putnal and somehow managed to
fraudulently obtain, in thirteen transactions, over $51,000 in cash from the
Putnal deposits made by her.64' When Putnal found out about the bookkee-
per's actions, it obtained copies of bank statements. 64 Putnal then demanded
that the Bank replace the funds in its account.63 The Bank refused on the
ground "that Putnal failed to notify it of [the] 'problems or unauthorized
transactions' within 60 days, as required [by] the Deposit Agreement.'644
Putnal sued the Bank for negligence and won on summary judgment.64 The
trial court determined that chapter 674 of the Florida Statutes applied and
that the Deposit Agreement was void, finding that the effect of the agreement
was an invalid disclaimer of the Bank's liability. 6  The First District Court
of Appeal reversed.67 The Bank was permitted to reduce the statutory noti-
fication time from one year to sixty days.64'8 This provision did not amount to
637. Id. at 1255 n.1.
638. Id.
639. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Putnal Seed & Grain, Inc., 965 So. 2d 300, 300-01 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
640. Id. at 301 (citing FLA. STAT. § 674.406(6) (2002)). It is not disclosed in the opinion
when, under the terms of the parties' agreement, the sixty-day period began to run, but that
was not an issue on appeal. Id.
641. Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
642. Id. It is not stated in the opinion as to how Putnal found out about the fraud. See
Bank of Am., N.A., 965 So. 2d at 300.
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. Id. at 301.
647. Bank of Am., N.A., 965 So. 2d. at 302.
648. See id. at 301.
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a forbidden disclaimer of responsibility on the part of the Bank under section
674.103(1) of the Florida Statutes.649
E. Exempt Property
The Florida Legislature amended section 222.25(4) of the Florida Sta-
tutes, and that statute now reads, in part
[t]he following property is exempt from attachment, garnishment,
or other legal process:
(4) A debtor's interest in personal property, not to exceed $4000, if
the debtor does not claim .. . the benefits of a homestead
exemption under s. 4, Art. X of the State Constitution
-the real estate homestead exemption. 650 Article X, section 4, subsection
(a)(2) of the Florida Constitution also grants a $1000 personal property ex-
emption, and has for some time.651 The United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Middle District of Florida was called upon to decide if section 222.25(4)
increases the personal property exemption by $3000 to $4000, or by $4000 to
$5000, for Floridians not claiming the real estate homestead exemption.652
The court stated that the legislative history of the amendment to section
222.25(4) clearly shows a legislative intention to increase by $3000 to
$4000.653 However, the court, adopting the debtor's argument, ruled that a
maximum $4000, rather than $5000, interpretation of the section would
amount to the legislature impermissibly altering or amending a constitutional
provision, that is, article X, section 4, subsection (a)(2). 654 The total maxi-
mum personal property exemption under the constitution and the statute was
held to be $5000 for "a person who does not own homestead [real estate] or
claim a homestead [real estate] exemption. ' '655
649. Id.
650. In re Bezares, 377 B.R. 413, 414 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (quoting FLA. STAT. §
222.25(4) (2007)).
651. See id.
652. Id.
653. Id.
654. Id. at415.
655. In re Bezares, 377 B.R. at 415.
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